CHAPTER II.
On Mans Instinctive Belief in the Constancy of Nature.
1. When a child strikes a table for the first time with a
spoon, its delight in the consequent noise is not more obvious, than the
confidence wherewith it anticipates a repetition of the noise on a repetition
of the stroke. That the same antecedent should be followed by the same
consequent does not appear to be the lesson of a protracted experience. The
anticipation of a similar result from a similar conjunction of circumstances
appears to be as strong in infancy as in manhood. We hold it to be not an
acquired but an original faith, because we perceive it in full operation as far
back as we can observe in the history of a human creature. We are not sensible
of a period in the history of our own mind when this lesson had yet to be
learned - neither can we perceive any indication in the youngest children, that
they are destitute of this faith, or that they have yet subsequently to acquire
it. Therefore we call it an instinctive faith - not the fruit of observation or
experience, however much these may afterwards confirm it; so as to verify the
glorious coclueion of an unfailing harmony between the actual truth of things,
and the implanted tendencies of that intellect which the Creator hath given us.
2. It. is a frequent and perhaps a natural impression that faith in the
constancy of nature is not an instinct antecedent to experience, but the fruit
of that experience, produced by it at first, and strengthened by every new or
repeated experience of the constancy of nature afterwards. But it has been well
remarked by Dr. Brown, that no repetition however frequent of the same sequence
can account for our anticipation of its recurrence, without such an original
principle of belief as we are now contending for. We admit that there is no
logical connexion between the proposition that a certain event has happened
once in given circumstances, and the proposition that the same event will
happen always in the same circumstances. But neither is there any logical
connexion between the proposition that the event has happened a thousand times
in certain circumstances, and the proposition that in the same circumstances it
will always so happen. The conversion of the past into the future, is made, not
in virtue of a logical inference; but in virtue of an instinctive expectation
and this at whatever stage the conversion may have been made. It is as
confidently made at the dawn as at the maturity of the understanding - . and
after one observation of a sequence, as after twenty or any number of
observations however great. We have not been schooled by experience into our
belief of natures constancy. Experience can only inform us of the past.
It tells what has been - but we need another informant beside memory to assure
us of what is to be. Experience tells us of the past constancy of nature - but
experience alone or memory alone can give no intimation of its future
constancy. This irresistible persuasion comes to us from another quarter. It
forms a distinct principle in the frame or workmanship of our intellectual
system. It is a befitting theme of gratitude and wonder that this instinctive
faith from within, should be responded to by the unexcepted fulfilment of
Natures actual and abiding constancy from without. But the one is not a
derivative from the other. The two are in harmony - but it is a contingent
harmony.
3. The use of experience is not to strengthen our faith in the
constancy of Natures sequences - but to inform us what the sequences
actually are. We do not need to be made surer than we are already that the
progressions of Nature are invariable - but we need to learn the steps of each
progression. As far as we can discover of the human mind, it counts, and has at
all times from its earliest capacities of thought, counted on the same
antecedents being followed up by the same consequents. It is not the office of
experience to lesson us into this confidence. But experience is indispensable
to teach us, which be the causal antecedents and which be the consequents
related to them by the tie of invariableness, in those successions that are
taking place around us. Our object on the repetition of an experiment is not to
be made sure that what Nature has done once in certain circumstances, she will
in the same circumstances do again. But it is to ascertain what the
circumstances really be which are essential to the result in question. The
truth is, that in that assemblage of circumstances which precedes some certain
event, there may only be one or so many of them that have causal influence upon
the result, and the rest may be mere accompaniments whose presence is not
necessary to the production of it. It is to distinguish the causal antecedents
from the merely casual ones, that an experiment has often to be varied or done
over again. It is not that we ever have the least suspicion of Nature as if she
fluctuated in her processes. But it is to disentangle these processes from that
crowd of accessaries, wherewith they are at times beset or encompassed, that we
have so repeatedly to question her. For this purpose we withdraw certain
ingredients from the assemblage. We supply certain others. We mix them up in
various proportions - and all this, not to strengthen our belief in the
regularity of Nature - but to discover what the trains or successions are,
according to which this regularity proceeds. We are not sure that the instinct
by which we are led to anticipate the same result in the same circumstances is
stronger in manhood than in infancy. But in manhood we know the result and we
know the circumstances. This seems the whole fruit of experience. It teaches
not the strength or invariableness of the connexion, that runs through all
nature - but it teaches the terms of that connexion.
4. And it is
instructive to observe the real process of an infants mind, during that
education by which it becomes acquainted with surrounding nature. When it
strikes the wooden table with a spoon, it needs not repeat the stroke for the
purpose of obtaining a surer or firmer expectation of the consequent noise.
That expectation is probably as confident at the first as afterward - and it is
of importance to remark, that at the outset of its experience it is quite
general and indiscriminate. For instance, it would anticipate the same noise by
striking the spoon against any surface whatever, as when placed on a carpet, or
on the level of a smooth sandy beach. Originally it would expect the same noise
by striking on a soft yielding substance that it did by striking on the hard
table - and the office of experience is not to strengthen its hope of a similar
result from a similar act, but in truth to correct the exuberance of that hope.
It is to teach it discrimination - and how in the midst of a general
resemblance, to mark those minuter differences which in fact present it with
antecedents that are really different, and which should lead it to expect
results that are different also. It is thus that the primary undirected and
diffused expectation, of meeting again with what it met once in the act of
striking with a spoon on a wooden surface, comes afterwards to be modified. It
learns - not that there is a surer tie between the terms of natures
sequences than it imagined at the first - but it learns how to distinguish
between the terms which are really different, though before it had vaguely
confounded them. And so it is taught with each distinct antecedent to look for
a distinct consequent instead of expecting the same noise by the infliction of
a stroke upon all surfaces, to expect no noise at all by a stroke upon the
sand, and different sorts of noises by a stroke on different surfaces, whether
wood or metal or stone or liquid.
5. Now this may explain how it is, that
our faith in the constancy of nature appears to grow with experience and that,
notwithstanding the obvious strength of this principle in very early childhood.
After an infant has once struck the table with a spoon and elicited the noise
which it likes, it proceeds with all confidence to repeat the stroke - not on
the table only, but on other substances, in expectation of a similar noise to
that which had pleased and gratified it before. But it is speedily checked in
this expectation. It learns that with every difference in the antecedent
circumstances, there may be a difference in the result - and it further learns
that there may often be real differences which escape its observation. Now the
longer it has been accustomed to witness the same phenomenon in the same
ostensible circumstances, it becomes the more confident that these are the only
essential circumstances to the result, or at least that the ostensible
circumstances always involve the essential or the real ones. Should it awake in
the morning, and perceive the nurse or mother by its side and smiling over it -
then were there but a moment of prior consciousness, and the recollection of
what had happened yesterday, it might on the next morning open its eyes with
expectation of being again regaled by the same spectacle.
We are not sure,
but that the confidence of this expectation would be as strong, if not stronger
at the first than ever afterwards. Every disappointment in fact would weaken
it- for the infant would thus learn that the presence of the causal antecedent,
which gave rise to the phenomenon, was not always involved in the circumstance
of its emerging from the darkness of sleep to the visible objects of day. Still
it holds true that the fewer the disappointments were to which it was exposed,
the original confidence would be less weakened. The recurrence of the same
thing for the days of a week would diminish its apprehension of a
disappointment or failure - and still more for the days of a month or the days
of a year. Yet we are not sure, if any experience, however lengthened, would
ever beget a stronger confidence than that original and unshaken confidence
that is felt prior to all experience. It seems the primary faith of every mind
that there shall be a constant recurrence of the same effect in the same
circumstances. It is a subsequent lesson to this that the circurnstances are
liable to unexpected variation - and so a protracted experience may be
requisite to ascertain when they are more and when they are less liable, or
whether they have sustained variation at all. Still even in cases where the
last conclusion has been come at, and with the advantage of a long experience
in its favour, the resulting anticipation may not be of greater strength than
was that original, anticipation wherewith the infant looked for a repetition of
the sound from its first repetition of a stroke. This long experience does not
act as a confirmer to strengthen the first anticipation. It only acts as a
restorative against the weakening effect of a subsequent experience; and by
which it may, as if by the removal of a disturbing force, bring the confidence,
not beyond, but bring it up to the strength which it originally had.
6. It
will thus be seen what the precise object is, of repetition in experiments. It
is not to strengthen our faith in the uniformity of Nature. It is not to assure
ourselves any more than we are already that the same antecedents will always be
followed up by the same consequents. It is to ascertain what the precise causal
antecedents actually are. For this purpose we introduce variations into the
circumstances of the experiment. We supply new conditions. We abstract old
ones. We make changes both on the presence and the proportion of certain
ingredients - and thus learn to distinguish what is merely accessary from what
is efficient in the process. We come to fix on the real and proper antecedents
at last-and when in an experimentunt crucis, these are admitted and no
other, we decide finally that they and they alone are essential to the result
in question.
7. Experience does not add to the confidence wherewith we look
for the same result in the same circumstances. It may rather be said to correct
or to modify that confidence. It teaches us how liable we are to be deceived by
semblances; and that often there is an apparent similarity where there is no
real one. In this case, when counting on a recurrence of the same, the
presumption is thwarted by the occurrence of a different event. Instead of
confidence we in certain views learn caution and distrust at the school of
experience - not that we ever question the invariableness wherewith the same
antecedents are always related to the same consequents - but that we have
learned how under the guise of similarity there may not be sameness; and that
in virtue of some unseen difference in the circumstances, an unexpected
difference in the result may arise from it.
8. But it is well for our
future argument to distinguish what the confidence is which is lessened from
what the confidence is which remains unshaken. The childs general
confidence in the production of a noise by the stroke of its spoon on any
surface has been thwarted and put an end to - but its special confidence in the
production of a noise by the stroke, of the spoon on its own wooden table
continues as strong as at the first. There is no mistake in that original and
instinctive faith of nature, by which we are led to expect that the same
antecedents will be followed in invariable succession by the same consequents
and it is not this which is corrected by experience. But we are liable to a
perpetual mistake, in confounding together as the same those antecedents which
are really differentand it is the office of experience to correct this mistake,
by teaching us so to discriminate as to distinguish betweeu the things which
are really different. There is a beautiful accordance between our primary
instincts of belief, and the lessons of our ultimate experience. We set out
strong in the presumption of Natures uniformity; and in this we are
disappointed at the first-only because we mistake Nature, and confound when we
ought to discriminate. In proportion as we learn to discriminate, the
confidence is restored - and we find it was no mistake that Nature proceeded by
trains of invariable phenomena, and that the only fallacy lay in our mistaking
and misreading the phenomena themselves. It is thus that in the further
progress of experience the temporary cloud is dissipated; and it at once
appears that every process is steadfast, and that every instinct is sure - that
Nature puts no deceitful expectation, and whispers no false promises into the
hearts of her children.
9. Let us now reassemble the different leading
phenomena of mans belief in the constancy of Nature. He in the first
instance is furnished with this belief and feels it strongly, antecedently to
experience. In the second instance, the experience does not add any further
assurance to this primary and instinctive faith. It rather seems to check its
anticipations, insomuch that distrust rather than confidence in the results of
experience seems to be the growth of our advancing observation. But this
proceeds not from Nature being untrue to her promise, which in the shape of an
original instinct she makes to all men, of always following up the same
antecedents by the same consequents. It proceeds from our imperfect
observation, whether of the antecedents or consequents, by which we imagine
them to be the same when they are really different. In proportion as this
imperfect observation is rectified, the steadfastness of Nature becomes more
manifest. The promise which she made to us at the outset is more and more
vindieated - and we at length are fully reassured of an unexcepted harmony
between the instincts of our internal constitution and the external truth of
things.
10. We may thus perceive the consistency between two propositions
which appear to be at variance. The first is that experience gives no addition
of strength to our primary Faith in the constancy of Nature. The second is that
the oftener we witness the same result in the same apparent circumstances, the
more confidently do we look for that result in these circumstances in all time
coming. It is not that we ever doubt the constancy of Nature. The doubt is,
whether the same causal antecedents which give rise to the result be always
involved in the same apparent circumstances. Should the same individual
regularly pass my window every day at the same hour for a. month together, I by
the end of that time should have acquired a pretty strong persuasion that at
the wonted hour he would again make his appearance. It is obvious that this
persuasion would become stronger with every new repetition of the phenomenon,
till at length I might come to regularly count upon it with a very high feeling
of prqbability upon its side. And yet in this instance, I may not at all know
the causal antecedents of the appearances in question. There might be nothing
at least in the ostensible antecedents to indicate the causal or real ones -
nothing in the mere occurrence of the hour which can explain to me, why it is
that this one person so regularly presents himself. It is enough however to
find that so it is-and the longer or the oftener that so it is, - the firmer
will be my expectation of its recurrence. The expectation will according to the
various instances attain to various degrees of strength - and in some will
reach indefinitely near to moral certainty.
11. The same thing will happen,
if in throwing a couple of dice, for a number of times there shall be. the
regular presentation of the same faces in both. of them. The expectation of the
phenomenon will gain in strength just with the continuance of it - and that,
anterior to our knowledge of its cause. Even previous to this knowledge it
might approach to moral certainty, merely by the length and constancy of the
repetition. - Yet no experience however prolonged will give a stronger
assurance than we might have had at once by observing that the dice was loaded,
and thus obtaining knowledge of the real antecedent.
12. There are cases
when without the knowledge, or at least without any reflection on the cause,
this constancy of a recurrence will lead us to look for it with all the
confidence of moral certainty. The return of the mornings light, and the
recurrence of about two tides every day are the examples of this which first
occur to us. The causal antecedent of the former phenomenon may not be
reflected on, and of the latter may not be known. Yet thing does not affect the
confidence wherewith we look forward to the repetition of them. It is a
confidence which evidently grows with the number of repetitions provided that
these have occurred with undeviating constancy. Yet we are not sure if the
unvarying experience of a whole lifetime will give a stronger assurance, than
that wherewith a child expects the recurrence of a noise by striking its spoon
upon the table after having heard it but once, or even by striking it upon any
other surface before that experience had taught it to distinguish between that
which is sonorous and that which is not so. The strength then of the primary
confidence on the part of the child, and that of the acquired confidence on the
part of the man, will be found to have originated in distinct causes. The
former is anterior to experience, and an instinct of the understanding, by
which, from the earliest dawn of thought, we feel assured that the same
antecedents will always be followed up by the same consequents. The latter
again is the fruit or the lesson. of experience; and the effect, it should be
remarked, is not to build up a confidence that is already perfect. That the
same antecedents will be followed by the same consequents is a truth whereof we
have the axiomatic certainty from the beginning of life to the close of it. But
we often mistake the antecedents, thinking them to be the same when they are
really different - and it is the office of experience to rectify this mistake.
We may even never come to know the efficient antecedents at all, as in the case
of the unlearned who are conversant with phenomena but have not so much as a
thought about the causes of them, save that, in the circumstances by which
these phenomena are wont to be preceded, their causes must be present or be
somehow involved in them. The darkness of night is not the cause of the light
of day - but they have learned by frequent observation, that, at the expiry of
a certain period of darkness, the cause of this light comes into operation.
Experience does not tell that the same cause always produces the same effect.
This we had been told previously. But experience tells what the circumstances
are in which the same cause is to be met with- and the oftener we so meet with
it, the greater is our confidence that in the same circumstances we shall meet
with it and with its invariable consequent again. These two tellings are wholly
distinct from each other. By the first we are assured of the invariable
operation of causes. By the second we learn in what assemblage of circumstances
the same causes are seldomer or oftener or always to be found. In regard to the
first there is the utmost strength of anticipation from the outset of our
mental history. In regard to the second there is a growing strength of
anticipation which approaches indefinitely towards a full assurance.
13.
That is well nigh to a full assurance wherewith we anticipate a high-water
about every twelve hours. We can conceive this assurance to be disappointed. It
is an imaginable case that there might have been the intermission of one tide
giving rise to an interval of somewhat more than twenty-four hours between two
high-waters. Let us suppose the sea at its lowest ebb, at the very time when,
according to the rate and regularity of all past experience, there should have
been an intermediate high-water. The question is on what evidence ought this to
be believed ? - or what force and character of proof can prevail over that
confident expectation, which, on the strength of an observed constancy during
all the years of our recollection, we had been led to form?
14.We shall not
at present oppose to the strength of this expectation either the evidence of
sense or the evidence of testimony. But there is a certain device of
illustration which we shall employ, as being the most effectual preparative
that we can think of for the evolving of our main argument.
15. Instead then
of having the evidence of sense for this anomalous low-water - we can imagine
the observer placed at a distance from the sea - and furnished with his
information of every rise and fall in its level by means of a tide-index. The
reality or the possibility of such an instrument is not essential to the
validity of our argument. An hypothetical reasoning may not be the less sound,
because of its imaginary data - and, if we can demonstrate a perfect analogy
between these data and others which are real, between the arbitrary conditions
which we find it convenient in the first instance to assume and the actual
conditions of the question that waits to be resolved, then, by a substitution
of the one for the other, we may arrive at the solution that is
wanted.
16.We may conceive then that on the day of the anomalous low-water,
the tide-index also remained low. To set aside all but my own personal
experience in the matter, there might have been a thousand instances of
observed regu]arity on my part, in regard to the occurrence of high-water - in
which case the probability against the occurrence of an anomalous low-water
would be as a thousand to one. It may further be conceived that though on all
the other thousand occasions, I observed a perfect harmony between the
phenomena of high and low-water and the indications of the instrument - yet
that on one occasion the instrument deceived me - it having anomalously stood
at low-water though there was high-water on the sea as usual. In this case my
expectation of a high-water grounded on past experience will prevail over my
faith in the information of the tide-index. The truth is that against the
actual occurrence of the anomalous low-water, the probability is as a thousand
to one - whereas against a wrong deposition on the part of the instrument the
probability is only as a thousand to two. There is a double chance for an
irregularity on the part of the instrument, rather than an irregularity on the
part of the ocean - and I am therefore not yet dislodged from my belief that
though the instrument did attest a low-water, the high-water took place as
usual.
17. One can imagine a still greater degree of irregularity on the
part of the tide-index. The number of failures (including the case in question)
may have been five or ten or twenty or fifty - in which case the chances of
error in the information given would just be represented by these respective
numbers and I would persist in my conviction of there having been a highwater
with a strength equal in the first case to that of two to one, in the second of
five to one, in the third of ten to one, in the fourth of twenty to one, and in
the fifth with a strength equal to that of fifty to one.
18. But we can
imagine an instrument that never misgave or made a false indication in the
whole course of our experience. We may have observed the stated recurrence of a
high-water at the usual interval a thousand times, and as many times, we may
have without fail observed the rise in the tide-index which corresponds
thereunto. That a low-water should occur instead of the next expected highwater
is a thing improbable in the ratio of a thousand to one. That the high-water
should occur and yet the index point to a low-water is also a thing improbable,
and in the same ratio of a thousand to one. The one improbability exactly
balances or neutralizes the other. The mind is left in in a midway state or in
a state of pure scepticism on the question-and it remains to be seen whether it
is possible by means of any accession to the testimony of these tide-indices,
to arrive at a legitimate belief in the occurrence of an anomalous low-water;
or, to express it otherwise, belief in the violation of a wonted order to which
we never had witnessed a single exception in the whole of our past experience.
19. It may be conceived in this way. The same instrument which set in a
particular way so relates it to the water of the sea as to indicate the
variations of its level, may be so set as to relate it similarly to other water
of variable level, as to that of a pond or a well or a vessel, the liquid in
all which was subject to alternate elevations and depressions. We have already
made the supposition of having observed the unfailing punctuality of its
informations in regard to the tides - so as to establish the probability of a
thousand to one in favour of that information being true. But should it inform
us of a low-water at the time when, on the strength of a thousand past
instances, we were left to expect a high-water the probability for the truth of
this information is exactly countervailed by an equal probability opposed to
it. By applying the same instrument however to the measurement of other
fluctuations in the level of water beside those of the sea, the samples of its
correct indication may be multiplied indefinitely. - , and instead of a
thousand observed instances in which it spoke the truth, we may in virtue of
this larger application be able to allege twenty thousand. After this it
remains no longer a contest of. equal experiences, but of unequal - and the
difference is all in favour of the witnessing instrument. If it depone to a
matter against which, apart from its own information, there is the probability
of a thousand to one, it should now be recollected that in the verity of this
information there is a probability of twenty thousand to one. Or in other words
we have a probability of twenty to one for the anomalous low-water. So that
with the evidence of one instrument alone, the violation of a long observed
order may be abundantly established; and it is a possible thing that the
experience which stands opposed to the testimony of this solitary witness may,
singly in the witness itself, be greatly surpassed by the experience in its
favour.
20. Or the accession to the evidence of the tide - index may be
obtained in another way. Instead of widening the range of its application, so
as to collect twenty thousand instances of its accuracy wherewith to overbear
the thousand instances of regular high-water, the very same power and
superiority of evidence could be had by means of another tide-index. We have
supposed a number of these instruments which, either from their various
mechanisms, or from their being constructed with more or less skill, gave forth
their depositions with more or less accuracy. Let us compute the effect then
which lies in the concurrence of two testimonies to the fact of an anomalous
low-water - one given by a tide-index of yet unfailing correctness, and another
which in the thousand instances of regular high-water failed no less than fifty
times. Still it has been twenty times right for once being wrong; and the
presumption in favour of its testimony for any indifferent thing is just as
twenty to onethough in favour of its testimony for an anomalous low-water in
the face of a thousand regular high-waters it be only as one to fifty. This
however does not prevent the multiple effect of its evidence when united with
that of another instrument. This tide-index which has been right without
exception in a thousand instances, has acquired the probability of a thousand
to one for its next deposition - and, should the other instrument which has
been right twenty times for one, agree in the same deposition, the united
testimony of both, has precisely the force of twenty thousand to, one for any
indifferent thing and in the present case of twenty to one for an anomalous low
water. There is no one versant in the doctrine of probabilities who will
dispute the soundness or accuracy of these conclusions -a doctrine not only of
mathematical precision in the abstract - but whose precision is verified on the
average in all the practical affairs of experience and human life. The
probability arising from the concurrence of the two testimonies which we have
now specified is just as we have stated it. And to vary the supposition -
should the tide-index which has failed ten times in a thousand, agree in its
evidence with the tide-index that has failed twenty times - still the former
has only been wrong once in a hundred times and the other once in fifty so that
their united testimony has in it the strength of five thousand to one for an
indifferent thing and five to one for an anomalous low-water. It were easy to
calculate the results in all other instances of agreement. The joint testimony
of the tide-gauge that has failed five times with that which has failed fifty
times has in it the absolute force of four thousand to one, or the relative
force of four to one for an anomalous low-water. The joint effect of the one
that has failed five times with the one that has failed ten is equivalent to
twenty in favour of the same fact - and should the evidence of the one that has
failed twenty times be added to the two former, the testimony of all the three
would have the force of no less than a million to one for any indifferent
thing, or of a thousand to one for the anomalous deviation which is the subject
of our argument.
21. On the subject of the amount of evidence that lies in
the concurrence of two or more such notices as we are now specifying, it must
be observed that these notices should be independent of each other. For
example, when the tide-index B announces a low-water, it must not be because
the tide-index A announces the same thing. Each by being similarly related to
the waters of the sea is subject to a common influence from it - but neither
should have any influence the one upon the other. It is easy to perceive that
in the present instance they stand so disjoined, as to give us the advantage of
all the united strength that lies in separate and independent testimonies. It
is not because A gives a right deposition that B gives the same. B is sometimes
wrong when A is right - and beside each would operate precisely as it does
though the other were removed or taken down.
22. By the concurrence of
independent notices on the subject, the amount of evidence for an anomalous
low-water may become indefinitely great. There may be other tide-indices, and
that too of the best sort, in other houses beside our own - and each of which
has never been known to present a false indication in the whole course of human
experience. The concurrent testimony of two such instruments yields the
probability of a thousand - of three no less than a million - till the number
of distinct and independent testimonies be so great as to make the superiority
of evidence quite overwhelming, and to afford practically the force of an
absolute moral certainty on the side of an anomalous low-water. Or, instead of
an anomalous if it be called a miraculous low-water - this is only lengthening
out the experience that we have had of Natures regularity in this
department of observation. Instead of one deviation in a thousand instances of
observed constancy, the event, in question may be the only deviation that has
taken place in the regular succession of tides since the commencement of the
world. To meet this we have just to imagine a tide-index that was never known
to give forth a false intimation; and to overmatch this, we have just to
imagine so many distinct and separate intimations from a certain number of such
indices. The falsity of the instrument may be as great an anomaly or if you
will as great a miracle as the phenomenon of which it tells - and the
concurrence of a few such miracles may establish for the truth of the miracle
deponed to as overwhelming a superiority of evidence as before. It remains to
be seen how much or how little can be done in this way by living witnesses but
it seems very clear to us on the strength of the above reasoning, that at the
mouth of two or three inanimate witnesses the truth of a miracle may be
established.
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