PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
On the Cognizance which the
Understanding takes of its own Processes.
1. IT has often been said of man that he is the greatest of
all mysteries to himself. What hath led to this saying is his profound
ignorance of that which is so immediately about him as his own sentient and
moral and intellectual economy. It is strange that to him the most deep and
difficult secrets are those which lie nearest to mm. Yet so it is - and however
inscrutable he may find Nature to be in all her departments, yet never does he
find her more so than among the recesses of his own internal system, and amid
the hidden workings of his own nature.
2. But it is of the utmost
practical importance to remark that though man knows not the proesess of that
complex economy by which it is that he moves and feels and thinks, it is not
necessary that he should, in order either to move aright, or to feel aright, or
even to think aright. In as far as the merely animal constitution is concerned,
this is quite palpable. That the processes of this constitution should go
rightly forward it is not necessary that he should understand them. He does not
need to study anatomy that he might find his way to the appropriate muscles by
which to move and turn himself. It is not by any intelligent guidance of his
that the processes of digestion and secretion and circulation are regulated.
The creature may be upheld in living play and in the healthful enjoyment of
life, although he should never have taken lessons on Physiology, or speculated
till he had lost his way among the arcana of vitality and the vital principle.
That the machinery of his own internal system may be kept prosperously a-going
it is no more required that he should look inwardly, than that he should look
outwardly or upwardly to the Heavens lest the mechanism of the Planetary system
should go into unhingement. The systems both of Astronomy and Anatomy are
independent of him - and though both lay hid in unrevealed mystery for ages,
yet did the one proceed as invariably and the other almost so, as now that they
have been somewhat opened to the gaze of his curiosity. A thing may operate
rightly though he kuows nothing of the nlodns operandi. To have the full use of
his animal system he is nearly as independent of the science of it, as any
inferior creature who is incapable of science_ - and who nevertheless in the
freshness and buoyancy of its own spontaneous powers can expatiate at large in
the element that is suited to it; and either revel in fields of air, or sport
itself in the waters of the sea, or luxuriate on the pastures of earth and all
by the adaptations of a self-mechanism, of the workings of which, nay even of
the existence of which it is wholly unconscious.
3. All this is
abundantly obvious - but it has not been sufficiently attended to, that the
remark is nearly as applicable to mans moral as to his animal
constitution. That this constitution be in a wholesome state, or that its
various faculties and functions should be in right adjustment, it is not
necessary for man the owner of this constitution to take a reflex view of it,
or become theoretically acquainted with the nature and the workings of this
inner mechanism. What has been said of physical may be as emphatically said of
moral and spiritual health. The vigorous clown may have all the use or
enjoyment of it - while all the science of it belongs to the sickly
valetudinarian. And in like manner the first may never have heard of a moral
sense, and yet both promptly discern and powerfully feel the obligations of
morality - while the second can subtly analyze that conscience, whose authority
he bids away from him. The truth is, that often when man is most alive to the
sense of what is duteous and incumbent, it is not to himself that he looks -
but to a fellow man whether an applicant for justice or charity who at the time
is present to his sight, or to God the sovereign claimant of piety and of all
righteousness, who at the time is present to his thoughts. So that all the
while he may have been looking outwardly to an object, and never once have east
an introverted view upon himself the subject. He may have been looking
objectively or forth of himself, and never subjectively or towards himself. He
may have taken in a right sensibility from the object that is without him, and
have been practically urged thereby in a right direction. There has been a real
inward process in consequence - but the process has only been described or
undergone; it has not been attended to. The organ whether of feeling or of
perception may be justly impressed with the object that is addressed to it -
while the man is wholly taken up with the object; and meanwhile all
consciousness of the organ is suspended. It is precisely like the man who can
see rightly that which is before him, although he should never think of the
eyes retina nor be aware of its existence. Notwithstanding his
well-conditioned moral state he may be as ignorant of the moral, as many a
peasant in a well-conditioned physical state is ignorant of the physical
anatomy. In the construction of our ethical systems, this distinction has not
been enough adverted to - between a knowledge of the objects of the science,
and a knowledge of the faculty by which these objects are perceived or judged
of. Certain it is, that without the latter knowledge there may, practically, he
a most correct intelligence and feeling in regard to the question of right and
wrong - nay the principles of this question may be philosophically arranged,
and a complete moral philosophy be framed without that peculiar analysis which
is resorted to by those who blend the moral with the mental philosophy.
4. But the same is also true of our intellectual constitution. It may
be in a sound state and may operate. soundly - though we should never have
bestowed one thought upon it. That the understanding may proceed aright on the
many thousand objects of human thought, it is not necessary that it should take
any cognizance of its own processes. We admit that the procedure of the human
understanding forms one, and that too a most interesting. topic of inquiry. But
it is not necessary to have mastered this topic, ere we are qualified to enter
on other topics of inquiry. The truth is, that a man may have put forth his
understanding with wisdom and with a warrantable confidence on every other
department of human knowledge - and yet be a stranger to that one department,
the knowledge of his own intellectual processes. In a word the understanding
may understand every thing but itself - we mean every thing that is within the
circle of our mental acquisitions. We may work well with an instrument, though
we do not attend to the workings of the instrument. We do not first look to the
instrument of thought, and then to the objects of thought - or first to that
which understands, and then to that which is to be understood. We investigate
without one thought of the investigating mind - just as to ascertain the
visible properties of that which is before it, the eye, instead of looking to
itself, looks openly and directly forth of itself, and on the outer field of
contemplation.
5. There are many who exercise their intellectual powers
vigorously and soundly, without ever once casting an introverted eye on their
mode of operation who, in contact only with the objects of reasoning, never
once bestow a formal or express thought on the act of reasoning, yet reason
conclusively and well - who, busied with nothing else for example but lines and
angles and surfaces, can prosecute a most logical and unexceptionable train of
argumentation, yet have never made of logic a science or a study - who can
travel the whole round of our existing mathematics, without one thought of that
mind which performs every footstep, or the working of that machinery within to
which they are indebted for every inch of their progress. It is all the while
with something apart from the understanding that the thinking principle is
engaged, and not with the understanding itself - and while there are many who,
to magnify their own office, will tell of the science of mind that it is the
parent of all other sciences; and which therefore occupy a place that is
posterior and subordinate - we feel it to be certain that Newton might have
done all that he has achieved in geometry, that he might have made the same
skilful applications of it to the physics and philosophy of the material
universe, that he might have unravelled the mazy heavens and moved with
gigantic footstep from one wondrous discovery to another, without one reflex
thought on the operations of that faculty within his breast, which yet was the
instrument of all his triumphs. He did not first medicate his understanding by
the prescriptions of logic, and then go forth with it on the theatre of its
exercise. But he went forth with it in all the vigour of its immediate and
original health, and fastened it at once on the objects of physical
investigation. Even the three Laws of Nature by which he introduces the
Principia to his reader, he gathered, not from the field of his internal, but
from or that of his external contemplations. They are not laws of mind, but
laws which have their jurisdiction in surrounding space and it is by looking
intelligently there, and not by looking to itself that the mind is enabled to
recognise them.
6. On this subject we hold Dr. Brown to have overrated
the importance of the mental philosophy - both when he says that a right view
of the science of mind is essential to every other science - and when he says
that to the philosophy of mind, every speculation in every science may be
said to have relation as a common centre. A certain given effect may be
found to depend on a particular thing, and yet may not at all depend on our
knowledge of the thing. He seems to have confounded these two - and to have
ascribed that to our knowledge of a thing which was only due to the thing
itself. It is true that the actual results in every science depend not merely
on the nature of the objects investigated, but on the nature of the
investigating mind - and that with minds differently constituted, or having
other powers and perceptions than those which do in fact belong to us, all our
sciences would be affected with a corresponding difference. A differently
constituted mental system in our species, would have made all our sciences
different from those which make up our existing philosophy_but that is not to
say, that we must first study the actual construction of our minds, ere we can
enter on the study of the actual sciences. Science as it is, may be regarded as
the compound effects of two ingredients of mind as it is, and of that which the
mind investigates even the subject-matter of the science. Change one of these
ingredients even the mind-and this will give rise to the new compound of a
science different and differently modified. But it does not follow that because
all science thus depends on the nature of that ingredient, it therefore depends
on our knowledge of that ingredient. It is most true that as the mind is, so
effectively the science is. But we bring about the effect simply by using the
mind, although we should not have studied it. The philosopher goes forth upon
nature with such a mind, as he finds himself to have - and the result is a
science in the state we now actually behold it. Had he found himself with a
different mind, he would still have gone forth upon nature; and the result
would have been a science different from the present one. But in neither case
does he look reflexly upon the mind, nor is it necessary that he should. It is
no doubt the instrument of all his discoveries - but mental though it be, it is
iio more essential to his sound and effective working of it that he should
become acquainted with the laws of mind, than it is essential for an artisan in
order that he might work his instrument rightly to become acquainted with the
laws of matter. Had our minds been constituted otherwise than they are, we
should have had a different mental physiology and corresponding to this, a
different set of the sciences. The working of our mental physiology is
indispensable to our acquisition of all the sciences; but the knowledge of our
mental physiology is not indispensable to the acquisition of any of the
sciences, save of the science of mind alone.
7. The mind, in the work of
investigating any object beside itself, employs the laws of thought - just as
the mechanic in working with his tools employs the laws of matter. But it is
not necessary in either case that the laws, whether of matter or of mind,
should have been previously investigated by the operator himself. The resulting
view or the resulting feeling of the minds attention to any object, apart
from itself, is the composed effect of what the mind is and of what the object
is - so that if the constitution of the mind were , altered, the view or the
feeling would also be altered. What the mind is, is therefore indispensable to
the result, but not our knowledge of what the mind is; and therefore though in
direct contradiction to Dr. Brown we hold that every branch of the
physics of mere matter could be cultivated to its highest degree of accuracy
and perfection, without our ever having reflected on the nature of that
intellectual medium through which alone the phenomena of matter become visible
to us."
8. The analogy which he institutes between the mind and a
telescope, viewed as instruments of observation, will not make good his
argument. He tells us that to expect an acquaintance with external things
without acquaintance with the natural medium of the intellect - were as vain as
to expect that we should form an accurate judgment as to the figure and
distance and colour of an object at which we look through the artificial medium
of an optical glass, without paying any regard to the colour and refractory
power of the medium itself - and that, to the astronomer the faculty by
which he calculates the disturbing forces that operate on a satellite of
Jupiter, in its revolutions round its primary planet, is as much an instrument
of his art as the telescope by which he distinguishes that almost invisible
orb; and it is as important and surely as interesting to know the real power of
the intellectual instrument which he uses, not for calculations of this kind
only, but for all the speculative and moral purposes of life, as it can be to
know the exact power of that subordinate instrument, which he uses only for his
occasional survey of the heavens.
Now our design in the
examination of an optical glass previous to the use of it, is to compare its
intimations with those of the eye, that we might reduce both to the same
standard, But a like scientific exantination of the eye is not at all called
for - we having already arrived at the confident use of it by the education of
the senses, or that busy interchange and comparison of notices between the
sight and the mouth, during which, from early infancy, the mind has all along
felt that it was holding converse not with itself but with the external world.
The confidence wherewith we use the natural instruments, whether of the eye or
of the mind, is the fruit of a gross and general experience; and no reflex or
introverted view which the mind can now take of its own operation will add to
that confidence. And after that either by our own science or the report of
scientific men, we have obtained confidence in the use of an optical glass, we
look no longer to it - but through it, and to the object on which object it is
that our attention terminates and rests. And after that by the tuition of
nature under which the homeliest peasant has risen to as great a proficiency as
ourselves, we have acquired the confident use of our senses, we look neither to
them nor to the mind, but from the mind and on the object of contemplation.
9. Although to the physiology of the mind belong all those powers and
processes, by which it is that it acquires the knowledge of things which are
separate from itself, and therefore the working of this physiology is anterior
to the acquirement of all knowledge - yet the knowledge of this physiology is
not so anterior. The physiology may be at work, soundly and successfully at
work, without being at all understood or even adverted to just as a man may
operate rightly and fulfil the whole practical object of some piece of
machinery that has been put into his hands, although he understands not the
construction of it. The mental physiology in regard to its being must have the
historical precedency over all science - but the science of this physiology has
no such historical precedency over all other science. Suppose, that, instead of
access by consciousness to the mechanism of my own intellect, I had access by
some new channel of observation to the mechanism of the intellect of another
man, and that I saw him busily and prosperously engaged in the study or
contemplation of some one department of external nature - it is by looking to
him certainly, that I should extend my knowledge of the world of spirit-but it
would be by looking to the very same place on which his regards are fastened,
that I should extend my knowledge of the world of sense. For this latter
purpose, I would just as little look towards him, as he is doing himself, at
the moment when his attention is intently fastened on some outer field of
contemplation. To obtain the accurate perception of a tree, I should not look
to the faint and perhaps muddy reflection of it, from the waters of that lake
on whose margin it is standing - and neither should I look to the mind of
another, nor yet to my own mind, that from the mental reflection which is
exhibited there, I might learn of that material world which stands in its own
direct revelation before me.
10. It has been affirmed in plea for the
priority of the study of mind, over all other studies, that it is only by means
of just conceptions in regard to the powers and the province of the human
intellect, that certain illusions have been dissipated which were not merely
unphilosophical in themselves, but which, so long as they lasted and had
currency in the world, did effectually baffle the progress of all philosophy.
But we, I contend, who now are in a state of freedom from these illusions, have
no call upon us for attending to the process by which they were destroyed. The
ingenious sophistries of Hume led to the conclusion that the material world had
no existence but in our own shadowy imaginations. But is that a reason why, ere
I enter on the Natural Philosophy by which the laws of matter are investigated,
I who have no doubt upon the subject, must first be satisfied of the superior
force of that reasoning by which the sophistries of Hume have been overthrown?
I am not at all troubled with those sensible species which schoolmen chose to
interpose between the human mind and those external realities by which it is
encompassed - and am I therefore to be troubled ere I can clear my way to an
immediate converse with these realities, with those masterly demonstrations of
a sounder and better intellectual Philosophy, by which all the species and
spectres of the middle ages have at length been put to flight? Because there
are men in all ages, who have wandered from the direct path of simplicity and
common sense in pursuit of some laborious follies of their own, can I who
do not share in these follies only find access to that path across the still
more laborious Philosophy which has now extinguished them for ever? The
elaborate perversities of the human mind may require the elaboration equally
severe of some great master-spirit to overturn them. But now that these
perversities have gone into oblivion, and the temporary purpose of their utter
destruction has been accomplished - is it for us to leave the obvious and
rectilineal path which Nature has marked out, in pursuit of every wild
deviation, or even of the retracing path by which the wanderers have been
called back again. We utterly refuse the right of human folly in past
generations to lay such a tax upon posterity and though aware that a whole
millennium of thickest intellectual darkness passed over the world, and that it
was only dispersed by the philosophy of Bacon - yet now that he has set us on
the right path of investigation, in that path we may go, alike unconscious of
those false lights by which our ancestors were bewildered, or of that greater
light which put out them all. The confidence of Nature was disturbed by the
reveries of the schoolmen. But now that these reveries are dissipated the
confidence is restored. - And. without once having looked on the Novum Organum
of Bacon, there is not a human creature in the maturity of his ordinary
understanding, who does not know his great and simple lesson, and only great
because of the monstrous absurdities by which for ages it was wholly overborne
- even that to ascertain the visible qualities of an object we must look, or
its sonorous qualities we must listen, or its tangible qualities we must
handle, or its dunensions we must measure.
11. There is no doubt that
the view which we are le to take on every one subject of human knowledge is
dependent on the physiology of the mind. But that is not to say that we must
therefore become first acquainted with this physiology, ere we set ourseives to
the acquirement of all other kaowJedg~. There can be no doubt that because such
is the constitution of the mind, such therefore are its modes of reasoning and
of judging on all the objects of possible contemplation. But it does not on
that account follow, that we must first study this constitution ere we proceed
to the study of any thing else. The powers of the mind are antecedent to the
acquirements of the mind. But the knowledge of those powers by which the
acquirements are gotten is not antecedent to that krl,owledge in which the
acquirements consist. The mind is the instrument of all its own acquisitions
but the instrument has been long tried and used and has also accomplished a
great deal of work, before its properties have become the objects of our
separate investigation. It is true that without a retina and without a picture
of that which is external being spread out there, there could have been no
science of optics. But it is just as true that it would have been as clear and
demonstrative a science as it is at this moment, though anatomists had never
found their way to this phenomenon, and the very first touch of their
dissecting instrument had so injured the whole of the visual apparatus as to
have made the exhibition impossible. And in like manner, there is a certainty
and an evidence in many of the sciences that is altogether unaffected either by
the success or the failure of our speculations on the mental physiology. When I
look to the lines and the angles of Geometry, it is not to the diagram upon my
retina, but to the diagram upon the paper or upon the board - and in like
manner when I prosecute the train of its clear and resistless argumentatioris,
I look only to the evidence that beams upon me from the subject itself,and not
to the mind which has been so constructed as to be the recipient of that
evidence. It is thus that physical science may, up to its proudest altitudes,
have become the mental acquirement of him who has never once cast a regard on
the mental physiology - and we should be doing what is preposterous, we should
be inverting the experimental order of things, did we insist that the scholar
should have a clear insight into the machinery of his intellectual powers, ere
we asked him to set that machinery a-going, or by a busy forth-putting of these
powers to attain a clear insight upon the other departments of human
contemplation.
12. Men judged well and reasoned well on a thousand
objects of contemplation, long before the mental acts of judging and reasoning
became the objects of contemplation themselves. When these in their turn became
the distinct objects of thought, they underwent the same treatment as all the
other objects of thought do when treated philosophically - that is, they were
grouped and classified according to their resemblances into the various modes
of ratiocination. Still the soundness of all the dif ferent reasonings was
felt, long before that Logic had pronounced upon it. It was not logic that
first authorized the reasonings - but logic went forth, as it were, on the
previous confident reasonings of men, just as the philosophic inquirer goes
forth among those phenomena which constitute the materials of a science, and
groupes or arranges them according to their common observed qualities. We
dispute not the use of logic - for the study of it implies, first attention to
the actual specimens or examples of valid argumentation - and then a
recognition by the mind of what that is which constitutes its validity - and we
cannot well be so engaged without becoming more expert both in the practice of
reasoning and in the detection of any flaw or infirmity in the process. All we
affirm is, that good and bad reasoning were felt to be such, before that any
reflex cognizance was taken of them. It is not by an anbecedent prescription of
logic that men defer to the authority of proofs but it is out of antecedently
felt and recognised proofs that the prescriptions of logic are framed. It was
not necessary first to devise a right system of logic, that from it men might
learn to reason conclusively and well - but this system is constructed upon an
after survey of those good and conclusive reasonings, which, anterior to its
guidance, had come forth on the field of human observation. The completion of a
right system of logic is therefore not indispensable to the practice of sound
reasoning, either in the business of life or in the sciences - neither does it
follow that an erroneous system would materially hinder the work of prosperous
investigation, in any quarter to which the intellect of man might betake
itself. The class of the logicians might differ among themselves; or
collectively they might fail in adjusting and building up a sound theory out of
those existing materials, which, in the shape of sound judgments and sound
reasonings, have been produced or are being produced every day by every other
class of inquirers. So that apart from logic, and even in the midst of
confusion and contrariety amongst the masters in the science, the general mind
of society might be proceeding rightly onward, and multiplying the known
truths of all the other sciences; and that whether they are truths which lie at
a great depth and are fetched upward as it were by an act of shrewd intuition,
or lie at a great distance and are reached forward by a consecutive train of
argument. Each process may be most correctly done by the immediate agent,
whether or not it be correctly described by the logician who is looking over
him.
13. It should be remarked however that even in the study of
universal Logic, the mind is not at all times studying itself. It is not
necessarily looking inwards, when attending either to the modes or to the
prmciples of reasoning. It, for example, lays confident hold on the truth of
the axiom that every event must have a cause; or, proceeding on the constancy
of nature, that a like result is always to be anticipated in like circumstances
and in so doing it may be looking objectively and not subjectvely. We are not
to confound the act of the mind in judging with the thing that the mind judges
of. It is a mistake that the science of mental physiology envelopes, as it
were, the sciences of Logic and Ethics. The science of the mental physiology
takes cognizance of the various states of the mind as phenomena, and groups
them into laws or classes according to their observed resemblances. But this is
a different employment from that of estimating either what is sound in morals
or sound in reasoning. The question, what are the states of emotion or the
intellectual states whereof the mind is susceptible, is another question
altogether from what that is which constitutes the right and wrong in
character, or what that is which constitutes the right and wrong in argument.
Mental physiology has been too much blended with the sciences of Ethics and
Logic, so as to be regarded in some degree as identical studies. They are not
so. It is only when the first principles whether of Logic or of Ethics are
controverted, that we are thrown back as it were on our own minds, to take a
view there, of what the laws are, whether of human feeling or of human thought.
When there is a denial of first principles, this is the only way left to us, of
meeting either the moral or the intellectual scepticism. We have no other
resource than simply to state the minds original and instinctive and
withal resistless tendencies, whether in matters of belief or in matters of
sentiment. It is at this part only of a logical or ethical discussion, that the
constitution of the mind comes into notice as a direct object of contemplation.
There is a certain obstinate scepticism which cannot be reasoned against, and
which can be contravened in no other way, than by an affirmation of the
minds instinctive confidence in those principles which constitute both
the basis and the cement of all reasoning.
14. It is of importance to
remark how confidently, and withal how correctly these first principles of
belief were proceeded on, ere they were adverted to as parts of the minds
constitution. The phenomena of belief are antecedent to any notice or knowledge
on our part of the laws or the principles of belief. Men achieved the
intellectual process legitimately, ere the legitimacy of the process was traced
or recognised. From the beginning of the world mans faith in the
constancy of nature was as vigorously in operation as now - and, for many ages
before that it was announced as one of the instincts of the human
understanding, did it serve for mans practical guidance both in the
business of life, and in the prosecution of all the sciences. And what is true
of the infancy of the - species is also true of the infancy of each individual.
It is with his rational as with his animal economy. Each goeth on prosperously
and well, without any reflex view of the operations of, either. It would appear
that from the very outset of the education of the senses, there are certain
original principles of belief which are in most efficient play; and the
practical result of it is the infants sound education. The following are
the admirable observations of Dr. Thomas Brown on the habitudes and powers of
the little reasoner - and we bring them forward that we may discriminate more
clearly between a mental process as done by one individual, and the same
process, as described by another individual who is looking over him. After
having analyzed the process of an infants mind, he says I am aware
that the application to an infant, of a process of reasoning expressed in terms
of such grave and formal philosophic nomenclature, has some chance of appearing
ridiculous. But the reasoning itself is very different from the terms employed
to express it, and is truly as simple and natural as the terms, which our
language obliges us to employ in expressing it, are abstract and artificial.
The infant however, in his feeling of the similarity of antecedents and
consequents, and of the necessity therefore of a new antecedent, where the
consequent is different has the reasoning but not the terms. He does not form
the proposition as universal and applicable to cases that have not yet existed;
but he feels it in every particular case as it occurs. That he does truly
reason with at least as much subtilty as is involved in the process now
supposed, cannot be doubted by those who attend to the manifest results of his
little inductions, in those acquisitions of knowledge which show themselves in
the actions, and I may say almost in the very looks of the little reasoner - at
a period long before that to which his own remembrance is afterwards to extend,
when, in the maturer progress of his intellectual powers, the darkness of
eternity will meet his eye alike, whether he attempts to gaze on the past or on
the future; and the wish to know the events with which he is afterwards to be
occupied and interested, will not be more unavailing than the wish to retrace
events that were the occupation and interest of the most important years of his
existence. - Even then many a process of ratiocination is going on,
which might have served as an example of Strict logic to Aristotle himself; and
which affords results far more valuable to the individual reasoner, than all
the contents of all the folios of the crowd of that gleat logicians
scholastic commentators.
15. Whatever then may be involved in the
formation of a right system of logic - whether the logician for this purpose
should have to classify the processes of reasoning, or to be studiously
observant of the mental phenomena, that is to say, whether he should have to
look objectively or subjectively, it is conceivable of his peculiar work that
it may be done either well or ill, and the work of all other inquirers in all
the other departments of human thought may go on vigorously and prosperously,
notwithstanding. One man may work a machine well, though another should
altogether fail in the description of it - and this just holds as true of a
reasoning piece of mechanism as of any other. The phenomena of belief, and of
sound belief, as existing in the mind of one man, may have been incorrectly
surveyed and stated by another acting in the capacity of his inspector. - but
that does not hinder, either the belief from being legitimate in itself, or
from its having been arrived at legitimately. We should not insist at such
length on a matter that seems so very obvious, did we not foresee the
importance of a certain apphcation to topics of Christian evidence that we
shall have occasion to make of it. The direct work of the understanding both in
Christianity and in the other branches of human investigation may be going on
rightly, while that work may be very far from being either discerned rightly or
described rightly. The understanding may understand other things, and yet not
understand itself. Its business may be well done, yet ill described. And while
wholesome processes of inference, leading to wholesome and most valuable
conclusions, are actually going on in every other department; it is conceivable
that the logician, baffled in the work of his department, may have found it
impracticable to make a thorough exposition of them.
16. And there are
many respects, in which a direct process of the understanding admits not of
being closely or completely followed up, by any reflex cognizance that might
afterwards be taken of it. We know, for example, that there are degrees of
evidence, and degrees of weaker or stronger belief corresponding thereunto.
There is a sort of general proportion between the evidence for a thing and the
impression of its credibility. Yet who can take account of these impressions?
Who can take an accurate measure of their intensity? Who can construct a
relative scale, by which the degrees of proof and the degrees of conviction
shall be placed in right correspondence together - and then tell in every
instance, whether the inquirers confidence is in just proportion to the
evidence that has been presented to him? Yet practically and really the
confidence will grow with the evidence, and may be in right proportion
thereunto, though any statement of the degree or the proportion be utterly
impossible. A man of rightly constituted understanding may judge rightly in
every, instance; while, in no one instance, might any man, though endowed with
the most subtle or powerful understanding upon earth, be able to assign
numerically how strong the judgment ought to be, in the given proofs or
likelihoods of that particular question which the mind may happen to entertain.
A peasant for example, of sound intellect, may give to a certain story the very
degree of credit which rightfully belongs to it. The appearances of its truth,
the seeming honesty of the witness, the whole turn and style of his relation,
the internal and circumstantial evidence which it possesses - all these may
have made their impression and, their just impression upon him. Other witnesses
may be conceived to superadd their testimony - and the conviction may be
strengthened, and strengthened in the fair and right proportion too, with every
accession to the evidence. He, sitting in the direct capacity ,of a judge in
the narrative, may be rightly impressed with all that is brought into the field
of his notice - and in the rate of his conviction, he may be keeping an equal
pace with the evidence as it grows and multiplies around him. But another
acting in the capacity of an inspector over him, whether as a logician or a
mental physiologist, may be utterly unable to estimate what the intensity of
his belief is, or whether it accurately corresponds to the degree of
probability that lies in the existing evidence. In other words the direct
process may be going on rightly, while a full reflex cognizance thereof may be
utterly impossible. It goes on rightly with the child at the outset of his
natural education - although it be impossible to trace it metaphysically. It
goes on rightly with the unlettered workman - and the results of it. are
neither less true and important in themselves, nor less valuable to him;
although in this case both a metaphysical description of the process, and a
logical estimate of the proof had been alike impossible.
17. Were these
principles rightly appreciated, it would serve to qualify and we indeed think
to do away the contempt which is often felt and expressed for the popular
understanding. When it is said of the common people that they are not
logicians, this may be true if it be meant, that they seldom take a reflex view
of the processes of intellect, and are strangers to the terms of that
nomenclature by which these processes are described. But that is not to hinder
their going most correctly and intelligently through the processes themselves.
Though incapable of the reflex, they may be abundantly capable of the direct
process - and on a thousand subjects calling forth the exercise of mind, but
which are apart from the subject of mind itself, they do evince a shrewdness
and penetration for which too little credit is given to them. Generally
speaking, an unlettered workman knows nothing of the philosophy of testimony
yet without this knowledge he may be accurately impressed by the importance of
any actual or specific testimony which is brought within his reach. On the
strength of those instinctive principles of belief which are in busy operation
within him, though he himself hath never taken account of them; and on the
strength of his general and accumulated experience - he may have a very correct
sense of the verisimilitudes that belong to many a question. The whole of the
judging process may have been accurately gone through by him, though the
metaphysique of the process should be wholly inaccessible to himself, or even
though it should be equally inaccessible to the most subtle and philosophical
of discerners. This does not hinder the process from going on rightly. The
mechanism of the inner man works, though he never looks at the working of it.
The judgment which is part of that mechanism may do its part and do it soundly
and well - so as that evidence shall have its just impression upon him, though
the philosophy of that evidence was never once the subject of any reflex
investigation.
18. The testimony of the early Christians to the
miracles of the evangelical record, has from time to time been addressed to the
public by a series of writers who have very ably urged and expounded it. And in
many thousands of instances it has had its proper effect on those who attended
to it. The consistency and sincerity by which the whole narrative is so
obviously pervaded the number and opportunities of the original witnesses, and
the manner in which their testimony has been sustained by the close and
continuous succession of others who came after them - the rapid propagation of
Christianity in the face of opposition, each of its friends having in the very
fact of his conversion left his own distinct confirmation behind him, and each
of its enemies having done the same thing in the fact of his silence - these
topics have undergone repeated elucidation in the hands of the defenders of
Christianity; and the felt force of them on the minds of the readers was not
countervailed by any thing like another force felt to be equal or superior, in
the merely miraculous character of the events which were related. It had
doubtless been all along the feeling that a miracle required a greater weight
and amount of testimony to make it credible than an ordinary event. But it
never, we believe, was imagined till about the middle of the last century, that
such in the very nature of a miracle was its unconquerable resistance to proof,
as to place it beyond the reach and possibility of being established by any
testimony, whatever may be its character and whatever its abundance. This
discovery was not made in the act of attending to the specific miracles of the
New Testament, or of weighing the specific testimonies by which they are
supported. It is a discovery grounded on the considerations of a general logic
which takes cognizance either of the principles of reasoning, or of the
properties of the reasoning mind. It never, we believe, was suggested to any
mind, when immediately engaged in the direct process of viewing or of
estimating the actual evidence for the miracles of the gospel. It is altogether
the fruit of a reflex process, which terminate as it might, leaves the direct
process to go on very much as before. We believe it of any candid and
intelligent man that, after the study of Mr. Humes Essay on Miracles, he,
on betaking himself again to the study of the evangelical narratives and of all
its vouchers, cannot help being impressed just .as he wont to be. The
speculation may stagger him; and he labour and be at a loss when trying to
adjust the metaphysics of the general question. But in reading Paley or
Littleton or Butler, he does not feel that countervailing force in the mere
idea of a miracle which the Scottish metaphysician has ascribed to it. It is on
the general question only that he is bewildered - for when engaged with the
particular question of the christian miracles - when in contrast with the
ipsa corpora of this latter question, his old convictions return to him.
In the act of reasoning on the immediate subject-matter of the New Testament
history, his invincible tendency is to think and feel as before. It is when he
reasons upon the reasoning that he gets involved again in helpless obscurity.
This new principle of human belief he may find it exceedingly difficult
satisfactorily to dispose of; but from what himself feels he may gather the
strong and general apprehension, that with the phenomena of human belief it is
not certainly in accordance.
19. The treatment which Mr. Hurnes
argument has met with in the two countries of England and Scotland is
strikingly in unison with the genius of the respective people. The savans of
our nation have certainly a greater taste and inclination for the reflex
process, while it is more the property of our southern neighbours to enter,
vigorously and immediately and with all that instinctive confidence wherewith
nature has endowed us, on the business of the direct one. Our general tendency
is to date our argument from a higher point than the English does - to reason
for example about reasoning, before we proceed to reason about the matter on
hand. Nay, we are apt to be so far misled as to think that we should thoroughly
comprehend the nature and properties of the instrument of ratiocination, before
we, proceed to the use of it. We must do this, it is thought, else we do not
begin at the beginning - though in fact this were just such a beginning as that
of the labourer who should imagine that ere he enters with the spade in his
hand on the work of digging, he must first have computed the powers of its
wedge, or ascertained the specific weight and cohesion of its materials. There
is upon an infinity of subjects, much intellectual labour that may be most
prosperously gone through, without any anterior examination on our part of the
intellectual faculty. Our disposition in many a question is to move a previous
question which must be first settled, ere we hold ourselves in a condition for
starting fair with the one immediately before us. The English again, to borrow
another phrase from their own parliamentary language, are for proceeding to the
order of the day. And they are not deceived in the result - just because nature
has not deceived them, nor has she given original principles to her children
for the purpose of leading them astray. They are like men set forth on the
survey of a landscape, and who proceed immediately to the business of seeing
whereas the others, ere they shall have any dealing with the objects of vision,
must have settled their account with the instrument of vision - so that while
the former are looking. broadly and confidently outwards on the scene of
observation, the latter are speculating on the organ and its retina, or have
their thoughts intently fastened on that point whence the optic nerve issues
from its primitive obscurity among the convolutions of the brain. Now this is
what our friends in the south seem to have no patience for. Their
characteristic is not subtlety of discrimination on the powers and principles
of the mind - but often admirable soundness and sagacity in the direct
application of their powers to the practical object of coming to a right
judgment on all important questions. Dr. Paley stands forth in full dimensions
as an exemplar of this class. Strong and healthful in his faculties, he turns
them to the immediate business before him, without one reflex look at the
faculties themselves. He bestows on the argument of Hume a few touches of his
sagacity but soon flings it as if. in distaste or intolerance away from him. We
hold this to have been the general reception of it in our sister kingdom and
while taken upin grave and philosophic style by Campbell and Brown and Murray
and Cook and Somerville and the Edinburgh Reviewers, it seems to have made
comparatively little impression on the best authors of England on Penrose for
example, who bestows on it but slight and cursory notice, and Le Bas who almost
thinks it enough to have barely characterized it as a wretched fallacy.
20. Paley concludes his preparatory considera tions to his book on the
Evidences with the following short practical answer to Humes essay .. -
But the short consideration which, independently of every other,
convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Humes conclusion is
the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the first thing
he does with it is to try it upon a simple case; and if it produce a false
result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in the demonstration. Now to
proceed in this way with what may be called Mr. Humes theorem: If twelve
men whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and
circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their
eyes, and in which it was impossible that they should be deceived; if the
governor of the country, hearing a rumour of this account, should call these
men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the
imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one
voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case;
if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different
effect; if it was at last executed; if I myself saw them, one after another,
consenting to be racked, burnt or strangled rather than give up, the truth of
their account; still, if Mr. Humes rule be my guide, I am not to believe
them. Now I undertake to say that there is not a sceptic in the world who
would not believe them; or who would defend such incredulity. - There is
something nationally characteristic, in their respective treatments of the same
subject, by the Scottish Hume and the English Paley. It exhibits a contest
between sound sense and subtle metaphysics. Paley, is quite right in his
concluding deliverance. The falsehood of the twelve men, in the circumstances
and with the characteristics which he ascribes to them, would be more
improbable than all the miracles put together of the New Testament. It is a
correct judgment that he gives; but he declines to state the principles of the
judgment. Nor is it necessary in ten thousand instances that a man should be
able to assign the principles of his judgment, in order to make that judgment a
sound and unexceptionable one. There is many a right intellectual process
undergone by those, who never once reflect upon the process nor attempt the
description of it. The direct process is one thing; the reflex view of it is
another. Paley sees most instantly and vividly the falsehood of Humes
theorem in a particular case; and this satisfies him of a mistake in the
demonstration. But this is a different thing from undertaking to show the
fallacy of the demonstration on. its own general principles - as different as
were the refutation of a mathematical proposition by the measurement of a
figure constructed in the terms of that proposition, from the general and
logical refutation of it grounded on the import of the terms themselves. This
is certainly a desirable thing to be done; and all we have to say at present
is, that this is what Paley has failed to accomplish.
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