OWE no man anything. This precept of the
apostle, limited within these few words, may signify one or other of these two
things - either to leave not our debts unpaid; or, higher, and many would say
more scrupulous still, never get into debt. The clause now quoted of our
present verse may be looked to as a repetition of the clause in that verse
which goes immediately before it - Render unto all their dues -
what is due, (debiturn, debt,) being the same with what is owing. And in this
form too it admits of both the interpretations now given; either let every debt
be at length cancelled, or let no debt ever be contracted. Never let it become
a debt - Be in no mans books. If he be an individual with whom you are
dealing, pay the moment that you buy. Or if it be the government, and so the
liability is not a price but a tax paid on the day that it becomes due.
According to the usages of society, the injunction in this latter or more
rigorous meaning of it is far from being generlly adhered to.
Perhaps
it may not at all times suit the conveniences or even the possibilities of
business, that each single transaction should be what in familiar phrase is
termed a ready-money transaction. Perhaps even in the matters of family
expenditure, it might save trouble, instead of paying daily and in detail, to
pay at certain terms; and so with the consent, nay even the preference of both
parties, is there often a running of accounts, and a discharge or settlement of
these periodically. We shall not therefore insist very resolutely or
dogmatically on this rule of the apostle, in the literal or extreme sense of
it. Perhaps it were an over-sensitive casuistry, a sort of ultraism in morals,
to urge the unexcepted observance of our text in the very terms of this its
second interpretation. There can be no doubt, however, that in the first
interpretation of it, it is a matter of absolute and universal obligation.
Though we cannot just say with full and perfect assurance, that a man should
never in any circumstances get into debt - we can feel no hesitation in saying,
that, once in, he should labour most strenuously and with all his might, to get
out of it. I will not therefore be so altogether intolerent and peremptory, as
to give it forth in the style of an aphorism or dictation - that he should
never become a debtor to any man, be it for a single month or even single day.
Yet will we proclaim it as a very high and undoubted ethical propriety - that
each man, if in business, should so square his enterprises to his means; or, if
in whatever else, should so square his expenditure to his income, as to be at
all times within the limits of sufficiency or safety - so that, should the
computation at any time be made, and were the settlement of all reckonings and
claims whatsoever to take place at the moment accordingly, it be found of him
at the very least, that in eustomary phrase he was even with the world, and so
as that he could leave the world and owe no man any thing.
But though
unwilling to press the duty of our text in the extreme and rigorous sense of it
- yet I would fain aspire towards the full and practical establishment thereof,
so as that the habit might become at length universal, not only of paying all
debts, but even of making conscience never to contract, and therefore never to
owe any. For although this might never be reached, it is well it should be
looked at, nay moved forward to, as a sort of optimism, every approximation to
which were a distinct step in advance, both for the moral aud economic good of
society. For, first, in the world of trade, one cannot be insensible to the
dire mischief that ensues from the spirit often so rampant, of ai excessive and
unwarrantable speculation - so as to make it the most desirable of all
consummations that the system of credit should at length give way, and what has
been termed the ready-money system, the system of immediate payments in every
commercial transaction, should be substituted in its place. The adventurer who,
in the walks of merchandise, trades beyond his means, is often actuated by a
passion as intense, and we fear too as criminal, as is the gamester, who in the
haunts of fashionable dissipation, stakes beyond his fortune.
But it is
not the injury alone, which the ambition that precipitates him into such deep
and desperate hazards, brings upon his own character - neither is it the ruin
that the splendid bankruptcy in which it terminates brings upon his own family
- These are not the only evils which we deprecate - for over and above these,
there is a far heavier disaster, a consequence in the train of such
proceedings, of greatly wider and more malignant operation still, on the habit
and condition of the working classes, gathered in hundreds around the mushroom
establishment, and then thrown adrift among the other wrecks of its overthrow
in utter helplessness and destitution on society. This frenzy of men hasting to
be rich, like fever in the body natural, is a truly sore distemper in the body
politic. No doubt they are also sufferers themselves, piercing their own hearts
through with many sorrows; but it is the contemplation of this suffering in
masses, which the sons and daughters of industry in humble life so often earn
at their hands, that has ever led me to rank them among the, chief pests and
disturbers of a commonwealth. But again, if they who trade beyond their means
thus fall to be denounced, they especially in the higher and middle classes of
life, who spend beyond their means and so run themselves into debt, merit the
same condemnation. Perhaps they who buy on credit, certain of their inability
to pay, as compared with those who borrow on speculation, and though uncertain
of its proceeds, yet count on the favourable chances of success, so as that
they shall be able to pay all - perhaps the former are distinctly the more
inexcusable of the two.
But without entering on. this computation, we
can imagine nothing more glaringly unprincipled and selfish than the conduct of
those, who, to uphold their place and take part with their fellows in the giddy
rounds of the festive and fashionable world, force out a splendour and luxury
which their means are unequal to; and thus either build or adorn or entertain
in a style so costly, that it must be done not at their own expence, beggared
as they are by extravagance, but at the expence of tradesmen and artificers and
shopkeepers, whom they hurry onward to beggary with themselves. I do not need
to expatiate on a delinquency so grievous and undeniable as this. But you will
at once perceive, how both the rage of speculation, prompted by what the
apostle calls the lust of the eye, in the work of making a fortune; and the
rage of exhibition and excess, stimulated by the pride of life, in the work of
overspending it - the one sowing the wind, and the other reaping the whirlwind
- how both of these would be effectually mitigated and kept in check, were all
men to act on the sacred prohibition of "Owe no, man any thing.
But lastly, there is another application of this precept, to me the
most interesting of all - because of all others the application, which if fully
carried out, would tell more beneficially than any other on that high object of
enlightened philanthropy, the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and so
make a larger contribution than any we have yet specified to the well-being of
a then happy and healthful society. What I advert to as a thing of pre-eminent
worth and importance is, that men in humble life, our artizans, our mechanics,
and labourers, should be effectually taught in the art of owing no man any
thing; and learn to find their way from the pawn office to the savings
bank - so that, instead of debtors to the one, they should become depositors in
the other. That it is not so, is far more due to the want of management than to
the want of means; and it needs but the kindness and trouble of a few
benevolent attentions to put many on the way of it. It is this which, among
other objects, makes it so urgently desirable - that every town should be
broken up into small enough parishes, and every parish into small enough
districts; and an official superintendant be attached to each, who, in perfect
keeping with his character as a deacon, might charge himself with the economics
of the poor, and tell them how so to husband their resources, as to save
themselves from a sore and heavy burden, which often presses on them like an
incubus that they never can shake off - we mean the debt usually contracted at
the outset of a family establishment, and which keeps them in a state of
difficulty and dependence to the end of their days.
It is not to be
told how soon and how easily by a few cheap and simple and withal friendly
advices, the whole platform of humble life might come to be raised, and the
working classes be guided to an enlargement and sufficiency, which, save by
dint of their own sobriety and providential habits, can never be realised.
Though we cannot offer here the scientific demonstration of this great and
glorious result, we may at least be suffered, as an act of homage, to make this
acknowledgment in passing - that, in the practical department of Christianity,
only second to our admiration of its perfect ethical system, is the admiration
we have ever felt, and the unbounded confidence that we repose in the sound
political economy of the New Testament.
But to love one
another. The apostle here speaks of love as a debt, as a thing owing. He
would have it to be our only debt; and that this alone is what we should still
continue to owe, after having so acquitted ourselves of all other obligations,
as to owe nothing else. The point to be remarked upon is, that the apostle
should speak of love as a debt at all, as a thing that we owe - thus placing in
the same category the duty under which we lie to love one another, as the duty
to pay up the price of that which we had bought, or the sum that we had
borrowed from him. It is certainly not so regarded in the light of natural
conscience. We should never think that we did the same injustice to a neighbour
by withholding our love from him, as we did to a creditor by withholding from
him the payment of a debt. In that play or reciprocation of moral feeling and
moral judgment which takes place between men and men in society, these two
things are not so confounded. It is true that should God interpose with the
commandment that we should so love, we owe every thing to Him; and would
therefore, on this being intimated to us as His will, owe love to those who are
around us, and love to all men.
But we at present speak of our natural
sense of justice, as it decides and operates irrespectively of Gods will
in a community of human beings; and are considering how it would pronounce on
the matter of obligation - between the duty of paying an ordinary debt, and the
duty of loving. Now we must be conscious of a wide diversity in our moral
sensation,. if I may so term it, of these two things. I feel that I have a
right to the payment of that which is owing to me; and that for the exaction of
it I might bring the fear and the force of law to bear upon my debtor. I have
no such feeling of a right to his love; and did I assert or prosecute such a
right, did I try to seize upon the mans affections in the same way tlat I
might seize upon his goods, did I prefer a claim to his heart, and for the
making of it good put either fear or force into operation - there would soon be
found an element awanting, and which made this attempt at the compulsion of
anothers love to be altogether a thing most outrageously and ridiculously
wrong. The question still remains then as to any possible analogy between
things which at the first blush of them appear so different; and how it is,
that while in the most strict and literal sense of the word we owe a man the
full value of all that we may have bought or borrowed from him - how it is,
that with any propriety or by means of any figurative resemblance, I can be
said to owe him my love also. What gives the strongest impression of a
reciprocity in this matter, and brings it nearest to a thing of mutual and
equitable obligation is, that celebrated moral sentence of our great Teacher -
Whatsoever things ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so
unto them.
Now we all would that men should love us, rather than that
they should hate us; and it is a precept which at once announces its own
equity, that what we should like from men, we should do to men, if we wish them
to love us, it seems a selfish and unequitable thing, that we should not love
them back again; or that we should not be willing to give them that, which we
at the same time are abundantly willing to get from them. We do not just say,
that, even on this principle, the obligation to love others is placed on the
very same footing with the obligation to pay our debts - yet if on this
principle we do not strictly and literally owe them our love, the moral sense
of all men will go along with me when I say, that on this principle we at least
ought to love them. Surely if we should like all men to love us, it is nothing
but a fair and legitimate moral conclusion from this, that we in return should
or ought to love all men. Now I would have you attend to the two terms, the owe
and the ought. They have a common origin; and though not absolutely identical,
this of itself demonstrates, if human language be at all the interpreter of
human feeling, a certain affinity betwixt them. And accordingly they do
substantially resemble each other thus far, that both of them - the payment of
what we owe to others, and the love we are required to bear them - that both of
these are duties.
But though generally, and to this extent, they are
alike - still there is a difference between them; and on looking narrowly into
it, we shall find what the difference is. In the one duty the payment of debt,
there is not merely an obhigation upon the one side, there is a precise and
counterpart right upon the other - it being not only my duty to pay what I owe
to a creditor, but his right to challenge and enforce the payment. In the other
duty, the love of a neighbour, it might be my obligation thus to love, but not
necessarily his right to demand it of me. That there are other such duties,
will appear still more clearly from this example - the duty of forgiveness.
Here there may be an obligation, and most certainly no corresponding right - an
obligation on my part to forgive the offender, while it were a contradiction in
terms to say of him that he hath a right to be forgiven. The distinction is
quite familiar to ethical writers; and they have had recourse to a peculiar
nomenclature for the expression of it. In the one case, as with the virtues of
truth and justice, where there is both a duty on the one side and a counterpart
right upon the other, they are termed virtues of perfect obligation. In the
other case, as with benevolence, whether in the form of mercy or hospitality or
almsgiving or a kindness and courtesy beyond the general habits or expectations
of any given neighbourhood - these, though all of them virtues in themselves
which serve to grace and exalt the giver, yet for which no right or claim can
be alleged by the receiver - these are but the virtues of imperfect
obligations. This leads us to observe, that there are two distinct regimens,
and both on the side of morality. There is the regimen of fear, and the regimen
of conscience. Each might be brought to bear upon man at the same time, when
the duty to be performed is one of perfect obligation - which it is not only
right for every moral agent to observe; but in which also there is, counterpart
to this, the holder of a right, who might by legal enforcement compel the
observance of it, whether it be for the payment of a debt or the fulfilment of
a promise.
On the side then of one and, the same virtue, there might
both be the coarser regimen of fear, and the finer regimen of conscience - the
one put into operation by a government within the breast, which tells of the
right and the wrong, and, by the force of principle alone, persuades to the
former, and restrains from the latter - the other put into operation by the
government of a country which institutes a law, and ordains its penalties
against all the aggressions of injustice. One could imagine a virtuous society
where conscience was omnipotent and universal. - in virtue of which the
government of principle might have perfect and unlimited sway, and so the
government of law might be dispensed with. And there are many individuals,
whose honour and integrity are full . guarantees for their punctual discharge
of all the equities of social life; and of whom therefore it may be said that
the law is not needed for such righteous persons - of which indeed they often,
give proof, by the admirable way in which they acquit themselves also of the
generosities of social life, those virtues of imperfect obligation, wherewith
the law of the heart alone hath to do, and the law of the state or of the
statute-book has, or ought to have no concern. But though the law of conscience
be sufficient for these, it needs, in the actual state or character of
humanity,.and for the effectual regulation of the commonwealth at large - it
needs to be supplemented by the civil and criminal law of the country. And
accordingly both influences might tell at once on the same individual. Both
considerations are pressed by the apostle upon his converts - and this by the
way proves that the distinction on which we insist is not a vain one - when he
says, Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also
for conscience sake. It is well that you should keep hold of this
distinction between a lower and a higher regimen - the regimen of fear, and the
regimen of conscience-as it might prepare you for understanding another
regimen, even higher than that of conscience; and lead you along to another
distinction - we mean the distinction that we now announce between the regimen
of conscience and the regimen of love.
In every exercise of the
conscience, there seems a balancing between the right and the wrong - a
comparison of opposites, grounded on the knowledge both of good and evil,
whereupon, in virtue of its sense of rectitude, it enjoins a preference for the
one, and an avoidance of the other. Now this work of comparison on the part of
a moral agent, might as unnecessary be dispensed with - if in doing what is
right he always did that which he liked -best; or, in other words, if the taste
and affections did of themselves prompt, and at all times, that very conduct,
which, had the arbitration of conscience been required, it would have
pronounced to be our righteous and incumbent obligation. It might seem hard to
say that conscience in this case would be persueded - yet there is a certain
sense in which it would be true - for it is obvious enough, that if we
abandoned ourselves to our own hearts desire, and that desire was ever,
spontaneously and of its own full accord, on the side of that which is most
righteous and best, the office of conscience, at least for the purposes of
guidance or regulation, would then be uncalled for. And however difficult it
might be to say that love would supersede conscience, we need go no farther
than to our text for decisive instances of love superseding the commandment.
For certain it is, that if we thoroughly loved a neighbour, loved him as we do
ourselves, we could no more inflict pain or violence upon him than upon our own
persons - no more rob him of his property than cast our own into the fire - no
more deceive him by a falehood than willingly give ourselves up to the wiles of
an impostor - no more wish aught desirable thing of his to be ours, than we
should aught of ours to be either abstracted. or destroyed. To a man thus
actuated the prohibitions of kill not, and steal not, and lie not, and covet
not, were altogether superfluous - nor would his conscience need at all to
ruminate, on the rightfulness, either in respect of matter or authority, of any
of these commandments. What under the regimen of conscience would be a thing of
obedience - the very same, under the regimen of love, would be a thing of
inclination. Love would be an equivalent, nay a greatly overpassing substitute
for law. Under its simple and spontaneous impulse, there could be the working
of no ill. Of itself it would do the work of all the commandments. Where such
an enlargement takes place upon the character of man, the will might with all
safety be left to take the place of conscience. The law of God would be his
delight; nor could there be any hazard of disobedience at the hands of him, the
delight of whose heart lay in the fulfilling of the law.
Now the
question comes to be, Which is the higher moral state - that of him who loves
his neighbour as hmself, and in virtue of this affection would abstain from
doing him any evil; or of him who, without this affection, but in virtue of the
commandments, and under a sense not only of the authority, but their rightness,
would alike abstain from doing him any evil. Were it because of their authority
alone, then the obedience might proceed from an apprehension of the threatened
penalties, or be a forced obedience undr the regimen of fear. Were it because
of their rightness, then would it be a higher, for now a duteous obedience,
under the regimen of conscience. But what we ask is, Whether, when not because
he thinks of the commandments, but because he realises the saying in which they
are briefly comprehended, even loves his neighbour as himself - whether, when
it is because of this that he kills not and steals not and lies not and covets
not - whether it be not now a still higher, being now a willing obedience under
the regimen of love When he has gotten so far as that love supersedes law, has
he not reached a higher stage in this moral progression from one degre of
excellence to another ? - and were this consideration thoroughly pondered and
pursued into all its conequences, might it not serve to elucidate an else
mysterious passage of be Bible - where we read that the law was not made for a
righteous person, for a person thus far refined and exalted in his principles
and feelings - but for those in the ruder or more rudimental and initiatory
stages of their moral discipline; and who for the restraint or regulation of
their conduct needed that the coarser appliances of law, its obligations or
even its terrors, should he brought to bear upon them?
It is thus we
might understand the apostolic averment - That the law is not made for a
righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for
sinners, for unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of
mothers, for man-slayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile themselves
with mankind, for men-stealers, for liars, for perjured persons, and if there
be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine. To this purpose
serveth the law. It was added because of transgressions. Every
commandment in the decalogue, with the exception of the fifth - for we do not
except the fourth, which tells us not to work upon the Sabbath - is of a
negative or prohibitory, rather than of a prescriptive character. It tells us
not of the things which we are to do, but of the things which we are not to do;
and most certainly they are such-things, that if the moral dynamics of love to
God and love to man had full operation in our heart, we should have no wish for
the doing of them. And yet, as already hinted, we should feel it a hard and
difficult thing to say that love might supersede conscience; and so as that the
element of moral rightness, or the consideration of what we ought or of what we
owe, might never be present to the mind - merely because there reigned an
affection there, which formed a sufficient and a practical security for the
observance of them.
We apprehend that if destitute of the conception or
knowledge of the moral character of actions, as right or wrong, we should want
an essential feature of that resemblance to the Godhead, the restoration
whereof is one great object of the economy under which we sit - even His
admiration of the one and his abhorrence of the other, so that like Him we may
love righteousness and hate iniquity. It is true that Adam was interdicted in
paradise from the tree of knowledge of good and evil-and therefore that, apart
from this knowledge and by the spontaneous tendencies of his own perfect
nature, he may have been kept close to the one and altogether clear of the
other. But instead of this there was one commandment laid upon him - and by the
way a negative one, or not a bidding but a forbidding - even that he should not
eat of this tree. It was on his transgression thereof that his eyes were
opened;. and his conscience we have no doubt, his sense of good and evil and of
the difference between, them, would then come into vigorous play.
But
we must not therefore imagine that in the process of mans regeneration
this sense of good and evil behoves to be extinguished. He will be
renewed in knowledge; and as a proof that, though heaven be that
holy place into which sin doth not enter, yet that the knowledge or conception
of sin will be there, is evident from this, that holiness will be there; and
what is holiness but the fearful and determined recoil of perfect moral
excellence from all that is oposite to itself? - a property of such high
estimation, that some would vindicate the origin of evil, on the principle that
it afforded a scope for the display and the exercise of holiness. However this
may be, certain it is that the love or charity of heaven will not supersede
there the conscience or moral sense, which takes cognisance both of the good
and the evil - as manifested both by the song of the redeemed to Him who washed
them in His blood, and by their intelligent ascriptions to Him who sitteth on
the throne, of "Holy, Holy,Holy, Lord God Almighty; and Just and true are Thy
ways, Thou King of saints".
At all events, there seems to be a progression,
an ascent by successive stages from a lower to a higher discipline, in the
moral education. and moral history of our species - whether we comprehend or
not the various footsteps of it - As when the spirit of bondage gives way to
the spirit of adoption, or the oldness of the letter to the newness of the
spirit; or as when the terrors of the law are succeeded by a delight in the
law; or as when the commandment formerly graven on tables of stone, comes to be
graven on the fleshly tables of the heart; or as when the law fulfils but the
office of a preparatory schoolmaster for bringing men to Christ, or guiding
them onward to the higher lessons of the gospel; or finally, as when the
supremacy of law makes place for the supremacy of love, even of the charity
which never faileth, but abideth and reigneth everlastingly in heaven, after
that the means and the preparatives for this great consummation have all
vanished away. Im apt to think the man that could surround the sum of
things, and spy the heart of God, and secrets of His empire, Would speak but
love; with him the bright result would change the hue of intermediate scenes,
and make one thing of all theology.
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