CONSCIENCE AND THE BIBLE.
CONSCIENCE and the Bible have a common meeting-point
behind, as it were, or above, in law; and a common meeting-place in front, in
virtue. As they point upwards or backwards, their lines meet in divine law; as
they tend forwards or downwards, their lines meet in human virtue.
This
thought might be presented in a sort of diagram. Look at an elongated
diamond-shaped figure. At the extremities of a line drawn across between the
two larger angles, let conscience and the Bible stand inscribed; conscience on
the left, the Bible on the right. The other two extremities, those of a line
joining the smaller angles, may indicate the relative positions, tile one of
law, the other of virtue. Beginning at a point marked for law, draw two
diverging lines till they reach two other points, opposite to one another,
marked for conscience and the Bible respectively ; thereafter let the lines
converge till they come together in a fourth point ; that point may be marked
as denoting virtue.
Such is a sort of geometrical representation of the
positions occupied by law, the Bible, conscience, virtue, relatively to one
another. Law is prior to both conscience and the Bible; it is recognised as
prior by both of them; both of them look up to it and do it homage. Virtue
again is under them; it appeals to them; they judge it. Conscience and the
Bible acknowledge law; they approve virtue. And across the line joining law and
virtue, conscience and the Bible meet.
What then is law, as acknowledged by
conscience and the Bible? What is the virtue which they approve? These are the
two questions on the answer to which the solution of a third question, as to
the mutual relations of the two authorities, - conscience and the Bible, - may
largely depend.
I. What is law, as
acknowledged by conscience and the. Bible? It is a moral law; a law of right
and wrong. But of what nature?
It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the word
law is ambiguous. It has one meaning when it is used as a term of
jurisprudence, and another meaning altogether when it is applied to the
phenomena of natural science. What is called the law of the land, for instance,
is felt by all men to be a thing quite distinct, generically, from the physical
laws, or the laws of instinct. These last are generalization.s of facts
observed; the other is a rule authoritatively promulgated and judicially
enforced. The result of a fair induction of particular instances is embodied
and expressed in a general formula, to which we give the name, of law. It is a
natural law, or a law of nature, thus ascertained, that bodies gravitate
towards one another, and that the force of gravitation is inversely as the
squaxe of the distance. To most minds this language conveys a very different
idea from what they receive, when they are told that the laws under which they
live as citizens forbid and punish crime.
That the divine law is
essentially the same in principle with human law, both conscience and the Bible
clearly teach. The obligation to obey the law of God, commends itself to
conscience as identically of the same kind with the obligation to obey the law
of the land. And in the Bible, the magistrate is represented as wielding an
authority of the same kind with the authority of Deity. The rulers of the
people are called gods. The mere mention of this distinction must be enough.
But as it touches a point of supreme importance, and as a view adverse to that
now stated is widely prevalent in influential quarters, it is necessary to go
into the subject more fully.
The order established in creation is one
of the surest evidences of a creative mind. The more thoroughly it is observed,
tested, ascertained and developed, by the inquiries of science, the more
conclusively is it seen and felt to be so. Ranging over the myriads of ages of
which our globe retains the traces; subjecting the multitudinous stars of
heaven to her far-seeing telescope, and the all but prophetic calculations of
her exact mathematics; embracing all the living tribes that have ever peopled
the earth; mastering all the relations of social life, and all the conditions
of social prosperity ; - science seeks to reduce the whole complex mechanism
and manifold movements of the universe to a sort of uniformity, if not to
unity. And the more successful she is in this, the more thoroughly does she
establish the reign of one infinite and omnipotent Intelligence, planning all,
and presiding over all.
Now, law is the index, the assertor, the
vindicator of order. If there is to be order, there must be law. And it must be
law with its appropriate penalty. The more simple and universal the law - the
more self-acting and self-enforcing - the more perfect the order. Hence the
tendency, in the various departments of physical knowledge, to resolve
particular inductions into more comprehensive general maxims - to trace a
similarity of proportion throughout them all - to find the principles of sound,
of colour, of form, of weight and motion, identical; so that music, painting,
architecture, and the kindred art are said to be based on similar ratios or
relations of number; and such powers as those of light, heat, electricity,
galvanism, gravitation, converge towards some one radical element in the
constitution of matter, that is to cover the phenomena of them all. Even apart
from these higher speculations, the sense of law, as the security of order,
which is originally strong in the human mind, gains additional strength through
the investigation of nature. All things proceed according to law; and law
implies intelligence and design.
It seems but another step in the same
direction, to reduce the moral world also under the same rigid uniformity of
rule and order with the physical. There, too, the empire of law reigns. There
are laws according to which our intellectual, our active, our social, and our
moral faculties are respectively regulated in their exercise. There are laws of
association governing the intellect; laws of motive and habit guiding the
active powers; laws of taste and feeling controlling the social propensities;
and laws of truth, righteousness, and love, determining the moral judgments.
Thus man, as to his whole nature, is the subject of law. He thinks and acts, he
likes or dislikes, he approves or condemns, according to law - according to
laws proper to the different departments of his complex constitution. The
violation of any of these laws is his misfortune, or fault, - and his misery.
It is so, whichever of them it may be that is violated. The disorder, the evil,
may be greater, when it is the law of a higher department of his nature, than
when it is the law of a lower one. Redress and reparation may be more
difficult. But it is an injury of the same kind that is done in both cases; it
is a law of the same kind that is broken.
The apparent symmetry of a system
like this has an attraction for minds of a certain order. But how does it stand
the test of an appeal to consciousness? Try it in a single instance.
I
dash my foot against a stone. A physical law is outraged by me. It vindicates
itself: I suffer. But look at the different circumstances in which this may
happen. It is a mere accident - I am pitied. It is the result of gross
carelessness - I am pitied and laughed at. It is an injury inflicted on me - I
am pitied, and a desire is felt to avenge me of my adversary. It is, on my
part, a deliberate attempt to put an obstacle in the way of a crowded train - I
am execrated as a monster. It is a prompt impulse, at the risk of life, to take
an obstacle out of its way - I am lauded to the skies for my benevolence and
bravery.
Here there are several distinct laws - call them laws of
nature if you will - under which the same act or event~~ is considered, tried,
and judged. It is not with the same sentiment, - it is not even with similar
sentiments, - that the violation or observance of these several laws is
regarded. The violation or observance of the physical law which regulates the
contact of two hard bodies, as of my foot and a stone, cannot be reduced to the
same category with the violation or observance of the law which injustice and
wanton cruelty are felt to break, and which courage in a good cause fulfils and
honours. No sophistry can identify things which differ so widely.:; The
instinct of mankind revolts against the attempt
Let it be granted that
God governs by law all his creatures, from dead and shapeless matter, up
through all. the gradations and developments of organization and life, to the
highest order of mind. Is it law of the same kind throughout? Does not mind,
intelligent and free, as it is found in man, come in contact with a law wholly
unlike~ what holds dominion in the region of matter, - and in the region of
mind, as it unfolds itself among the most sagacious of the other living races
around us? Some points of contrast may be noted between this higher law and all
the other laws of nature and being.
In the first place, these other
laws are, all of them, we apprehend them, the products of induction. That
higher law we have by pure and simple intuition. That there are certain fixed
and general laws to which the processes of nature and the energies of life in
the universe are amenable, we learn - and what they are we learn - a posterior
by observation and experience - the observation and experience of ourselves and
others. The study of these laws is an inductive study. The sciences which treat
of them are inductive sciences. It is true, that we can and do bring to bear
upon them the intuitions of mathematics, - the a priori laws of thought which
give us the necessary conditions of time and space. It is under these
conditions that we investigate the phenomena of creation, and systematize or
codify its laws.
Still, essentially, they are laws forced upou us, a
posteriori, by induction. The moral law is impressed upon us, a priori, by
intuition. That there is a law of right and wrong, we know - and what it is, we
know - by an original and primary intuition. It is a law of thought, exactly as
those laws are, out of which geometry and algebra are evolved. The study of it
is a deductive study. The science of ethics is a deductive science. It is true,
that as we have to apply this law to the phenomena of voluntary action, there
is occasion for observation and experience; and the more there is of a large
and wise induction the better. In that view, the science which deals with this
law is a mixed science. It is like the science which applies the axioms and
demonstrations of the pure mathematics to the phenomena of practical astronomy.
Still, the law itself is not one which we arrive at through any process of
induction. It is known by intuition. It is given as an a priori law of thought
- an original principle of moral judgment.
In the second place, this
law is necessary, universal - eternal. These others are contingent. There is no
absolute necessity, in the nature of things, for their being always and
everywhere the same. We can conceive a world in which the law of gravitation
might be different from what it is here. The idea is not felt to involve
contradiction in terms, or an impossibility in thought. But we cannot even
imagine the possibility of an alteration of the law of right and wrong. We can
no more conceive of its being right to commit murder, and wrong to love our
neighbour, than we can conceive of two and two being five and not four. It is
easy, indeed, to make difficulties about this, sceptical writers have often
done. Look, they say, the varieties of opinion among nations - some justifying
and commending as virtues what others condemn crimes: Sparta encouraging
cleverness and success in theft; the Hindoos admiring the conjugal devotion of
the widow, as she casts herself on her husbands funeral pile, and
commending the maternal piety which sent the tender babe away from the
pollutions and ills of Man once, through the holy river, into a better land.
All such instances as these, however, the bare statement of them, if it be a
fair statement, shows that what really is commended is some quality universally
felt and allollowed to be commendable. The ill-informed and ill-regulated mind,
misled by a partial or erroneous induction, comes exclusively to dwell on that
quality, - to the omission other features of the transaction which impart to it
entirely opposite character. There is nothing, therefore, in these instances
that militates against the truth, which consciousness attests, that the law of
right and wrong is not contingent,. - that it is not arbitrary or
discretionary, like those other laws of nature which, for anything we can see,
might have been, and may yet be, different from what they are - but that it is
necessary and universal, like the axioms of intuitive science. In other words,
the law of God is, like God himself, eternal and immutable.
But
thirdly, and chiefly, this law has in it an element which none of these other
laws, not even the laws of number and extension, possess,. - the element of
command. lt speaks as having authority. It says, Thou shalt, and thou shalt
not. It makes me say, I ought, and I ought not. The physical law of heat tells
me a fact, that fire bums; and it suggests an inference, that if I go into
yonder burning fiery furnace, I shall be consumed and perish. It does not
certainly say, Thou shalt go; neither, however, does it say, Thou shalt not go.
And if the alternative be between that and worshipping the golden image, there
is a law which says, imperatively, Thou shalt go; for it says, Thou shalt
worship the Lord alone, and him only shalt thou serve.
The physical law
of health tells me a fact, that excessive toil and scanty food wear out the
body; and it suggests the inference, that if I toil the livelong day and night,
and give myself but a crust of bread to eat, I must ere long sink and die. It
does not certainly say, Thou shalt thus work in thy want; neither, however,
does it say, Thou shalt not. And if the alternative be between that and theft,
there is a law which says, imperatively, Thou shalt; for it says imperatively;
thou shalt not steal.
Even when the physical law comes nearest the
moral law, this distinction is to be observed. The physical law of health tells
the young man a certain fact, that sinful indulgence breeds disease; and it
suggests the salutary inference, that if he continues in the sin, he must
expext to reap the fruit of it in loathsome agony. Even here however, it is not
that law which speaks with a voice of command, but the law which says, Thou
shalt not commit adultery; Lust not in thy heart; Thou shalt not covet. In the
fourth place, it is a consequence of this eleme~ of rightful supremacy residing
in the moral law, and tinguishing it from all the others, that the breaking of
is something radically and essentially distinct from the breaking of any of
them. A man might be so wrong-headed as to insist on wording a question in
arithmetic in defiance of the law number, that two and two are four; or he
might try to master a problem in geometry by going in the teeth the law of
extension, that two straight lines cannot close a space. Of course he makes a
mess of his sum and his solution. It is an instance of mental aberration the
man is mad, we say; and that is all. A simple madness or wrong-headedness might
lead some extravagant idealist, out-Berkeleying Berkeley, to act upon theory of
the non-existence of matter, so as to knock head against every post, - coming
into collision with the material laws of force and weight
But apart
from extreme cases, what are the terms, even the strongest terms, which we can
fairly use in characterizing conduct that is opposed to what these natural laws
would seem to recommend? It is ignorance, or inadvertence, or imprudence. The
worst we can say of it is, that it is imprudence. And none of these terms are
terms of reproach necessarily - not even imprudence. They are quite consistent
with innocence, and indeed even with merit. A strong sense of duty, an impulse
of patriotic or generous feeling, will be accepted, any day, by the people, -
the best judges by far in such a matter, - as a set-off against the most
flagrant disregard of all the ordinary considerations of caution and wisdom.
And when either ignorance, or inadvertence, or imprudence is alleged as a moral
imputation against any one who has acted otherwise than these natural laws, if
they had been duly attended to, would have led him to act, and who has
consequently brought misfortune on himself and others, it will invariably be
found that the higher law comes in. Some precept or some principle of that law
has been outraged. And the measure of reproach is not the violation, more or
less wilful, of those natural laws, but the indifference, or the opposition,
which tbe act in question involves, to the eternal law of rectitude and duty.
Then again, on the other hand, ignorance, inadvertence, imprudence, -
any of these pleas, - may explain or palliate my conduct, viewed as in
antagonism to the natural laws. But none of them, nor all of them, will meet
the case when the moral law is concerned. I did it because I knew no better; I
did it without consideration and by mistake; it was very senseless and unwise
in me to do it; so you say when you have gone against any of the laws which
regulate the sequences of events, their following one another according to a
certain order in the physical, mental, and social world; so you say, and there
is no more to be said. You take the consequence. Or, perhaps, by some happy
chance, or some shrewd afterthought, or some wise appliance under a system that
admits of remedies and compensations, you escape the consequence. At all
events, learning by experience, you are more wary in time to come.
Look
now at Saul of Tarsus, consenting to the death of Stephen. He does it
ignorantly, not knowing what he does, thinking that he is doing God service. He
does it inadvertently, not considering sufficiently what he is about. It is the
height of imprudence; even with the light which he has he had better pause,
according to the sagacious counsel of Gamaliel. A wiser and calmer man would
not at that juncture commit himself against the Christians. Is that all? Does
that exhaust the case? Then, what is the meaning of the keen remorse which
seems always, in the midst of his happiest experience of mercy, to haunt the
memory of Paul? "For I am the least of the apostles, that am not meet to be
called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God" (1 Cor. xv. 9).
There is a law, the breach of which - whatever plea of ignorance, or
inadvertence, or imprudence, may be urged - is a very different matter from the
crossing or traversing of any of the instituted laws of nature. It is the
eternal law, the transgression of which is sin.
Hence, finally, in the
fifth place, it would seem to follow that the manner in which offences against
these other natural laws are dealt with, affords no safe analogy for judging of
the procedure on the part of the lawgiver, which transgressions of this moral
law may require. Every law of nature is enforced, or enforces itself, by an
appropriate penalty. The penalty is the destruction of whoever or whatever
thwarts the law. It is a penalty sure and inevitable, unless means are found to
make the person or thing offending conformable again to the law, and to prevent
or repair the injury which his or its nonconformity might do to the system of
which he or it is a part. It is a principle of the divine government, even in
the lower spheres of material and sentient nature, that the evil resulting from
a breach of any of its laws is either worked out of the system by the
destruction of the peccant member, or is repaired by some process of
amelioration and neutralization; amelioration as to the peccant member, and
neutralization as to the tendency of what is peccant to grow and perpetuate
itself.
I fall, and break my ann. I break a physical law, and the
penalty is the destruction of the limb. But there is a provision of nature
which not only knits the fractured bone, but compensates the system for any
harm that the fracture might do to it. So I escape the penalty; I am safe in
the use of my forfeited member still; and my body is all the stronger for the
accident.
Upon this analogy, an attempt has been made, not wisely, as I
think, nor successfully, to explain the manner in which, according to
tlìe Christian system, the great Lawgiver deals with sin as the
transgression of his jaw. That law is held to be of the very same nature with
the other laws on which the order of creation seems to depend. And the
wonderful provision made by God for meeting the case of mans violation of
it, is represented as identical in principle with those remedial provisions
which abound in nature, and by which injuries happening under the laws of
nature are repaired and redressed, with no ultimate damage, either to the
member offending - or to the system to which it belongs, but rather with
benefit to both.
It would be unsuitable to enlarge on this topic here,
and now. Let it suffice to say, that such a view is not more dangerous in its
theological aspect than it is madequate, at least, if not unsound, in its
philosophy. It confounds things that differ. It makes no sufficient account of
that moral government, that divine and eternal system of jurisprudence, which
such ideas as those of authority, right, duty, obligation, responsibility,
guilt, blame, crime - ideas expressed in every language, and, therefore,
indicating a universal instinct or intuition of the human mind - prove to be
the highest order in the universe. And surely we speculate somewhat too wildly
when we aspire to master the policy of Heaven; as if we could grasp, in some
principle or formula of unity that we think we have found out, the whole vast
and complicated plan of the divine administration. It is more in accordance
with the humility of true science, as well as with the humility which does not
seek to be wise above what is written, to accept the facts of conscience and
the statements of revelation on the particular subject in hand, - the
transgression of the moral law, - in their plain meaning, instead of aiming at
so wide a generalization. And if we do, we shall stand on surer ground. We
receive the combined testimony of conscience and revelation as to the demerit
of sin, the reality of judgment, the necessity of satisfaction. And we adore
the righteousness and love of the mysterious propitiatory sacrifice of the
cross.1 Such, then, is law, as acknowledged by conscience arid tile Bible; the
law to which both do homage. 1. The homage which conscience does to it is the
recognition of its legitimate authority. That faculty or principle of our moral
nature asserts a right of supremacy over all the particular affections, whether
of self-love or of social love, by which men are moved to action. It has
paramount authority within tile domain of voluntary choice. It is, however, a
delegated authority, and it is felt to be so. In fact, its own authority lies
in its apprehension of the authority of law. To assert and vindicate the
authority of law is its proper function. It is only in so far as it is
competent to the discharge of that function, that its own title to command is
valid. Can, then, its competency be relied on?
To interpret and apply
the law is an office requiring information. The bearing of the law on any
particular case can be rightly deterimined only when the information respecting
that case is exact and full. It is not the province of conscience to collect
information. It calls for information. It imposes the duty of inquiry. But the
conduct of the inquiry is devolved on the ordinary power of the understanding.
These are liable to err through:. their own infirmity, or the absence of the
means of knowledge. They may represent the case otherwise than it really is.
The obligation of the law of right and wrong may, in consequence, be asserted
erroneously. But, strictly speaking, that is not the fault of conscience.
Again, if the power whose function it is to vindicate the law is to
discharge that function well, it must rule de facto, or in faet, - as well as
de jure, or in right. A usurper, displacing it from its seat of authority, may
succeed in silencing it; or he may impose upon it by false representations; or
he may subject it to a torture that makes it incapable of true discernment.
Such a usurper is the will - the masterful will - backed by his accomplice,
habit. No faculty or affection in us, except the will, can set aside
conscience. But the will can do it. And it can do it so perseveringly, and so
violently; it can so imprison conscience in its own den, and so bandage the
eyes through which conscience sees, that law - the law of right and wrong -
shall be asserted very fitfully and very feebly, and shall soon cease to be
asserted at all. But I neither is this, strictly speaking, the fault of
conscience.
Still, in so far as the understanding is fallible, and the
will powerful, the competency, or at least the sufficiency of conscience, as
the vindicator and assertor of law, is indirectly, if not directly, affected.
And if the understanding is darkened, and the will debauched by sin, the risk
of fraud or force interfering with its fair and free dis.charge of that
function is immensely increased.
In itself: moreover, directly as well
as indirectly, conscience is injured and defiled by the entrance into the human
constitution of that blight of moral evil which has vitiated the whole nature
of man. The very facility with which it accepts the representations of a
darkened understanding, and yields to the force of a debauched will, proves it
to be not only infirm and irresolute, but inclined towards the side which these
other powers would have it to tolerate, if not to favour. It has lost that high
tone of faithful and cordial loyalty to the law and the Lawgiver to which, were
man in a right state, both the understanding and the will would be constrained
to defer.
Nevertheless, as regards its capacity of recognising both the
character and the authority of divine law, the conscience is upon the whole
intact. The corruption of our nature has not so vitiated the conscience as to
invalidate its conclusions when it discriminates between right and wrong, or
deprive it of its right to rule and be obeyed. If it had, our guilt would have
been less, and our recovery would have been impossible. For it is through the
conscience alone that a fallen, but yet free, intelligence can be reached. It
is to the conscience that the violated law appeals. It is the conscience that
accepts the sentence of condemnation. It is the conscience that pleads guilty
of sin as the transgression of the law, and welcomes the assurance of a
sufficient expiation, and an adequate satisfaction. Liberated from the
aberrations of an understanding darkened by alienation from God, and from the
excesses of a will at enmity with God, - liberated both of these extraneous
influences - quickened, and purged, by the Spirit, through belief of the truth,
- the conscience rejoices in its recovered power, - a power flowing from its
own free and loving allegiance to law, as the law of liberty and love, - to be
the effectual as well as the legitimate vindicator of its authority.
There is another manner in which the conscience may be set free - free
to see, to know, to assert, the whole melancholy and appalling truth - when the
guilty is to be dealt with, not in mercy, but in judgment; when they stand to
receive their sentence at the bar of God, - and pass away to endure it, -
compelled, in their own despite, to own the righteousness and majesty of law.
Such is the homage which conscience does to the law.
2. As to the
Bible, not to speak of the glorious eulogies, in either Testament, which extol
and celebrate the excellency of the law of the Lord, nor of the deep emotions
of reverence and delight with which holy men meditate on its perfection; let
the view which the Bible gives, throughout all its revelations, of the actual
present government under which the human race is placed, be well considered it
is impossible to find consistency in the sacred records on any other
supposition than this - that mankind are living on the earth under a respite.
The analogy of religion, natural and revealed, can be fully brought out only
upon that hypothesis. Men, here and now, are spirits in prison. The whole human
family under sentence of condemnation. The sentence is pended. For the race, it
is suspended till what Scripture calls the consummation of all things; for
individual members of the race, it is suspended till the moment of death. It
is, however, only suspended. And the condition on which it is suspended, the
end for which it is suspended, - as well as the ultimate issues of the
experiment in regard to those who do, and those who do not, acquiesce in the
condition of its suspension, and reach the end which the suspension is designed
to serve, - are all unfolded in the Bible. They are so unfolded, moreover, as
to present and submit to the free choice of all men the one only alternative of
which the case admits, - the alternative of prompt submission carrying with it
an immediate, legal justification, or of prolonged lawlessness and rebeffion,
sealing the inevitable doom of legal condemnation. It is homage to law
throughout.
On this subject it is relevant to quote, as summing up the
argument, the closing paragraph of the Examination of Maurices
Theological Essays" (p. 480), in which the controversy at issue between him and
his examiner is reduced to a single question: - That question, as it
seems to me, concerns the nature of the government of God. Is it a government
of law? Does God rule intelligent beings by a law? Certainly, I may be told.
Who doubts it? The government of God is a government of law, - of the law of
love. But I must be allowed again to ask, In what sense is it a government of
law? For the familiar use of the expression, laws of nature, has
introduced an ambiguity into this phrase. What is a government of law, a
government by law? If I am absolutely dependent upon a being possessed of
certain tastes, under the influence, let it be supposed, of a particular ruling
passion, - if he and I are inseparably bound together, so that I must make up
my mind to receive all my good from him, and find all my good in him, such as
he is; then, in his tastes, in his ruling passion, I have a law, conformity to
which is th condition of my wellbeing. Obviously, however, ruling passion in
him is a law to me, in precisely the same sense in which any quality in matter
is a law to me; in that sense and in no other. My intimate connection with the
material world makes conformity to the unchanging principles, according to
which its movementa. proceed, a condition of my wellbeing as a creature endowed
with a physical nature. My intimate connection with the being or person with
whom I am living, and am always to live, makes conformity to the unchanging
principles, or habit, or ruling passion according to which being uniformly
feels and acts, the condition of my wellbeing as a being endowed with the
capacity of feeling and acting as he does. Let his ruling passion be pure
charity or love. Then, in one sense, there is a law of love is brought
into contact with my will. The law of love is unbending, and it has in it an
element of wrath against the unlovely. My will is perverse, apt to incline
towards subjection to a usurping tyrant or an intruding tempter, capable of
almost infinite resistance. But the law of love works steadily on. It unfolds
and reveals itself, it embodies itself in action, it is manifested wonderfully
in redeeming and regenerating economy, and ultimately one cannot see how it can
fail to bring my will, and every reasonable will, into accordance with itself.
For any.thing I can perceive, government by law in any other sense than this,
is not recognized at all in the theology of these Essays.
It is
needless to add, that the whole theology of those who are commonly considered
orthodox and evangelical divines, is based upon an entirely different
conception both of government and of law. According to them it is an
administrative government that God exercises, - a government embracing in it
legislation, judicial procedure, calling to account, awarding sentences. It is
an authoritative law, with distinct sanctions annexed to it, that God
promulgates and enforces. This is what they understand when they speak of God
being a moral Ruler as well as a holy and loving Father. They cannot rid
themselves of the impression that both Scripture and conscience attest the
reality of such a government and such a law. It is under that impression that
they draw out from Scripture, to meet the anguish of conscience, those views of
the guilt of sin and its complete expiation, the corruption of nature and its
thorough renovation, - those views of pardon, peace, reconciliation, reward,
which they delight to urge upon all men in the name of Him who hath no
pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked should turn unto him
and live."
And it is under the same impression that they think they
find, in the essential freedom of the will of man as a responsible agent, an
explanation, on the one hand, of the possibility of evil entering into the
universe under the rule of a good and holy God; and on the other hand also, a
probable explanation of the impossibility of there being any provision of mercy
brought Within the reach of men, which does not imply a provision also for the
case of that mercy being neglected or refused."
II. Conscience and the Bible approve virtue as they
acknowledge law. What is this virtue? And what is the approbation with which
not only man, but Go regards it? The first of these questions it is not very
important either for philosophical or for practical purposes, to answer. What
is virtue? Is there any common quality that characterizes and identifies all
the actions or dispositions that are said to be virtuous? Yes, one may say they
are all useful; useful to the individual; useful to society. Utility is the
test of virtue. It may be so. Perhaps this is the simplest and most obvious
common quality that can be named. The habits and frames of mind that win
approbation are such as are useful. What then? Is it for their utility that
they are approved? The instinct of mankind says, No. As supplying an argument
from final causes for the goodness of God, till fact that the things which we
approve as virtuous are found invariably, on the whole, to be useful, may
deserve notice. That is not, however, the element which constitutes their
virtue, or, if the term may be allowed, their, virtuousness. Nor is much gained
when we add the element of intention or choice, and resolve all virtue into a
desire to be useful, or into benevolence, or good-will, or any other single
affection. The truth is, the affections which we approve as virtuous vary
indefinitely in their nature, and in the circumstances in which they are
exercised. No attempt to run them up into one common attribute has succeeded.
To discriminate, describe, and classify them is all that can be done. That is
the province of practical ethics.
The second inquiry, into the nature
of the approbation with which virtue is regarded, or into the state of mind
which it occasions in one contemplating it, is more interesting. Here, too, an
extreme passion for simplicity is to be deprecated. What we call approbation,
is a complex state of mind. It is not easy to give in short compass an
exhaustive analysis of it. But if allowance be made for what, perhaps, may
appear to some to be too fanciful a theory, - I think the harmony of conscience
and the Bible on this subject may be placed in a somewhat striking and graphic
light.
Take one of those states of mind which are admitted to possess a
moral character, whether good or bad, and trace it in its effects upon the
moral observer.
In the first place, the mere conception of it - the bare,
naked apprehension of it in the mind - gives rise, instantaneously, to a double
movement in the department with which it first comes in contact. That
department cornprehends the power or faculty of distinguishing what is true
from what is false, as well as what is fair and beautiful from what is the
reverse. These two functions, the judgment and the taste - the discernment of
truth and the sense of beauty - are intimately connected, if, indeed, they are
not all but identicaL They are both of them immediate and instantaneous in
their action, and they are mutually the handmaids of each other. A mathematic
proposition or demonstration, seen to be true, is felt to be beautiful. It
appeals to the taste, as well as to judgment; and in proportion as it satisfies
and convinces the judgment, it pleases and gratifies the taste. We speak of a
beautiful theorem, and it is the sense of beauty no less than the perception of
truth, which, when the difficulty of the search is overcome, and the discovery
successfully made, prompts the exclamation of delight I have found it! I have
found it! On the other hand, the peculiar field of taste, if any object awaken
the sense of. beauty, it will be found, at the same time, to command the
acquiescence of the judgment in it, as in what is true. When the eye rests on a
fair form or a beauteous scene, not only is it agreeable and soothing to the
taste, but judgment also approves of it as consistent with the truth of things.
When I am admiring a picture, or statue, landscape, I am conscious of a calm
conviction of reality similar to what I experience when I assent to an abstract
demonstration, just as, in return, when I perceive conclusive certainty of an
abstract demonstration, and a gratification of taste, precisely such as the
visible completeness of nature calls forth. Nor is this connection between the
judgment and the taste altogether unaccountable They are both simple acts or
operations of the mind; what is common to both is the apprehension of
contrariety and disunion removed, and consistency, compactness, or, in a word,
unity, established or restored.
In morals, this blending of the
judgment and the is very discernible. Let an evil action or an evil state of
mind be contemplated, and there is an uneasy apprehension of its opposition to
truth, along with a painful and oppressive sense of its deformity and
unloveliness. The judgment finds the true relations of things divided and
dissevered, and the taste recoils from the dislocation. Let the opposite virtue
be observed, and the faculty of comparison discerns agreement, coherence,
union, in the fitness of things as now adjusted, while the sense of beauty
rests and reposes in the harmony.
But there is a second and inner
chamber into which these actions or states of mind, apprehended, in the first
or outer chamber, as either true and beautiful, or false and foul, must now
pass; and that chamber is the seat of the emotions. The transition here is from
the head to the heart - from the mind, sitting in judgment at the gate, and
looking out with quick eye for all that is grand or fair, to the bosom in whose
depths the springs of feelilig lie. Through the judgment and the taste, moral
actions or states of mind reach and set in motion the affections; and, as in
the department of simple apprehension, - the outer hail of the soul, - there is
a double exercise of vigilance, and, as it were, a double scrutiny of all
corners, so, in their reception within, there is a double movement or
excitement among the dwellers there. The affections are doubly stirred. Are
both of the watchers satisfied? Do both of them concur in warranting the
entrant? Does the judgment attest his truth, and the taste relish his beauty?
Then, as lie enters in, the emotion of reverence or awe rises to bow before
him; the affection of love opens her arms to embrace him. Thus the moral action
or state of mind which, in the seat the intellect, carries conviction of truth
to the judgment awakens, in the region of the affections, the feeling of
profound veneration; while, again, in so far as it approves itself as beautiful
to the taste, it calls forth complacency and love. For, as truth is venerable,
so beauty amiable. What is true is to be revered; what is fair is to be loved.
There is still, however, a third apartment in which these objects of
our moral cognizance and observation -these moral actions or states of mind -
undergo yet another process. Behind, and farther in than the region of the
affections, lies the secret closet of the soul, the one of self-inspection and
self-judgment. From the mind head, with its twofold faculty of judgment and
taste- the discernment of truth and the sense of beauty - throughout the heart,
deeply stirred with the emotion of reverence and the affection of love-there is
a passage to the conscience, where the final act in this sifting trial is
performed. And here, again, there is a double function, responding to the
double functions of the other departments. In that sanctuary, that inner court
of last resort, these states of mind come to have final sentence passed upon
them, and the sentence has respect to the discernment which the judgment has of
what is true, and the apprehension which the sensibility has of what is false!
Truth, compelling conviction, and commanding reverence asks a verdict of
acquittal or acceptance, and will nothing more. Beauty, again, gratifying the
taste, and winning the affection of love, solicits a warmer welcome, and would
wish to receive approbation and applause. In the one view, there is a demand to
be justified; in the other, there is a desire to be praised and to be embraced.
It may be some recommendation of this analysis, or induction, that it
combines different theories, and comprehends various principles of our moral
nature, which the framers of moral systems have been accustomed to isolate.
Thus, the accordance with truth, or the fitness of things, which some have made
the foundation of moral judgment (Clarke, Cudworth, &c.), and the moral
sense or instinct to which others have appealed (Hutcheson, &c.), unite and
conspire in the first act of simple apprehension, by which the mind takes in
the conception of a moral action, or a moral quality, as right and good. Nor is
moral rectitude and goodness, on this scheme, a matter of reason exelusively,
or a matter of instinct or taste. The emotions and affections have a large
share in the work of identifying virtue, and giving it life and warmth (Sir
James Mackintosh). The emotion of reverence, and the affection or sentiment of
love, dealing with what has passed the calm scrutiny of the judgment and the
taste, touch the deep springs of holy awe and worship in the soul, and open the
fountain of its tears and gladness. Nor does the trial end here. The judge,
whose verdict is final, sits within. The moral action, or moral quality, under
review, must enter within the vail - into the very shrine, the holiest of all
in this living temple - where, on the throne, is the great arbiter, entitled
authoritatively to justify what is true (Butler), and at the same time, ready,
with lively sympathy, to commend what is fair (Adam Smith). The award of this
ruler of the soul which is the power or principle of conscience, is conclusive.
It determines what is just and righteous, and bestows meed of commendation on
what is excellent and worthy.
But the scheme, as it would seem, has a
still high value. It is in fine accordance with the moral system the New
Testament. For it is no rude or unskilled artist, but a master-hand, that has
constructed the noble climax in the Epistle to the Philippians (chap. iv. 8,
Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, what ever things are
honest" (honesta, venerable), whatsoever things are just, whatsoever
things are pure" ( chaste, fair, clean, undefiled, and holy), whatsoever
things are lovely" (amiable, loveable), what ever things are of good
report" ( commend such as to move sympathy, approval, applause); if there
be any virtue" ( power, stability, firmness), there be any praise" ( what
solicicits commendation), - " think on these things." There is something more
here than a casual enumeration of mere motives. The apostle was too much a
master both ethics and of rhetoric to heap up such materials miscellaneously
and at random. There is symmetry in structure; there is method and system in
his fervid approach. He traces and marks out the double line of approach
entrance, along which actions or qualities, admitted at door of the mind, are
conducted, through the heart the conscience. For there are two sets of
connected of observation in this sketch - two distinct series of successive
mental acts. The six names read over in this muster, or roll-call, fall into
two ranks; and each of these, at its termination, is represented by a single
leader, as in the following tabular view: -
"Whatsoever things are true," .
. . . . . . . . . . .Whatsoever things are pure," (fair,)
"Whatsoever
things are honest," (venerable,) Whatsoever things are"lovely," (amiable,)
Whatsoever things are "just," . . . . . . . . . . . . Whatsoever things are "of
good report,"
"if there be any virtue," . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .If
there be any praise"
Thus, of these epithets, the first three - what is
true, what is venerable, what is just - rank as a column under the one head,
virtue; the remaining three on the other hand - what is pure or fair, what is
lovely or amiable, what is of good report or commendable - are marshalled in
the line of praise.
Or, to change the application of the figure, let us
trace the subject of our scrutiny - the particular action or quality, whose
moral character is to be ascertained - from post to post, in the citadel of our
moral nature. At the gate it is challenged by the faculties of simple
apprehension, the judgment and the taste, the sense of natural agreement or
fitness, and the sense of beauty; is there in it anything true - is there in it
anything pure? Let it enter. Farther on it has to encounter the emotions or
affections, and they have to deal with it - the capacities of reverence and of
love must be satisfied; is there anything honest - venerable? is there anything
lovely - amiable? Let it pass, - the soul standing in awe of its majesty, and
rapt in the love of its gentler grace. But once more it is arrested. One having
authority, but at the same time full of sympathy, calls it to account; is there
anything just - right, righteous, coming up to the high standard of strict
duty? is there anything of good report - worthy, commendable, meet for being
warmly honoured and approved? If there be any virtue, any inherent strength of
conscious rectitude - if there be any praise, any moral beauty meet to be
applauded - then, by all that is true, venerable, and right, in the stern
integrity and firm standing of that virtue, and by all that is pure, amiable,
and worthy in the fair and soft charms of that praise or that commendableness,
and in its warm yearning for sympathy - let us be adjured, let us be persuaded
to give earnest heed and full practical effect to that gospel, whose highest
aim it is to restore and re-adjust the whole moral nature of man, so that truth
and righteousness, grace and love, may once more meet and embrace each other,
in the holy home of a reconciled and renovated soul.
Were further
illustration needed of this complex system, it might be found in the
discrimination, so exquisitely true to nature, which the same apostle makes
between two different kinds of character to be observed among. men. Magnifying
the divine benevolence, as manifested in the death of Christ, he puts it as an
all but impossible supposition that "a righteous man" should find a friend
prepared to lay down his life for him. He allows it to be more conceivable that
"a good man" might win affection thus devoted and self-sacrificing. And he
places in strong contrast that love of God, whose miserable objects had neither
"righteousness" nor "goodness" to recommend them, but only sin (Romans v. 7,
8).
"A righteous man" is such a one as the poet describes, "just and
firm of pmpose," one who is moved by neither fear nor favour from his solid
mind. Regulus, calmly turning away from his weeping family and the awe-struck
Senate, to redeem his pledge to the Carthaginian enemy, and meet the death
prepared for him, with its worse than Indian refinement of cruelty - Hampden
defying unjust power - Latimer cheering brother Ridley at the stake -
Knox before Queen Mary, and
Melville before King James,
maintaining allegiance to a Heavenly Master against both the tears and the
frowns of royalty - rise as examples before the mind. In each there is a stern
integrity - which we apprehend to be "true " - which we feel to be "venerable"
- which compels us to recognize it as inexorably and inflexibly "just " -
presenting, on the whole, a spectacle of moral courage and steadfast "virtue,"
almost beyond the reach of our commendation or compassion, such as rather
inspires a sort of deep and silent awe. We scarcely presume to praise or pity -
we stand apart and reverently look on. But let a touch of tenderness mingle in
the scene - let it be the Roman matron presenting to her trembling husband the
dagger plucked from her own bosom - " It is not painful, Petrus " - or Lady
Jane Grey bidding adieu to her lord, as he passed on to the scaffold, to which
she was soon to follow him - or Lady Russell, pen in hand, gazing on the noble
features she had loved - or Brown of Priesthills widow, meeting the rude
taunt of the persecutor as he interrupted her in her melancholy task - " What
thinkest thou of thy husband now, woman? - I thought ever much of him, and now
as much as ever " - or, coming down from the heroic to ordinary life, let it be
a character marked rather by gentle maimers and kind affections than by
strength of nerves, that is exhibited to us ; - and our moral taste is charmed
with its "pure" beauty - our heart is warmed with "love" towards it - we speak
of it as not only unimpeachably correct, but positively "worthy," and we award
to it the meed of our cordial sympathy and "praise."
The combination of
the two kinds of character, as in some of the instances referred to, is the
consummation of moral excellence. To be true, yet, at the same time, not stern
or severe, but fair, pure, graceful - to be both venerable and amiable, calling
forth in equal measure the emotion of reverence and the affection of love - to
stand before the tribunal of conscience and receive, not only the cold verdict
which strict justice, caring for nothing more, extorts, I find no fault, but
that also, which a softer sensibility asks, Well done - in short, to be both
great and good - such is the idea of a perfect man. Such was He who was not
only "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from. sinners," but also "meek
and lowly in heart" - .: "full both of grace and of truth." Such His
Gospel intended and fitted to make all those who, following, at a humble
distance, His example, and changed, by His Spirit, into His image, unite with
the "faithfulness unto death" which challenges "the crown of life," "the
ornament of a meek and quiet spirit," which not only is of good report and
praiseworthy among men, but, "in the sight of God himself, is of great price."
III. Conscience and the Bible thus
agreeing, on theone hand, in the acknowledgment of law, and, on the other hand,
in the approbation of virtue, are of necessity closely related to one another.
Their mutual relations form the third subject of inquiry, on which a slight
indication of the beads or topics must now suffice.
1. In the first
place they are to be recognized as distinct from one another, and independent
of one another. It may be true, and probably is true, in point of fact, that
God never has left us to discover our duty by the dictation of conscience
alone, as he has never left us to arrive at the knowledge of his own being and
perfcctions by the discoveries of reason alone. From the beginning God revealed
himself and his will, by means of words, to men. He spoke to them of his own
character, purposes, and plans. He placed them under an explicit and formal
obligation of obedience to an explicit and formal commandment. That, however,
does not impeach either the competency of reason to prove the truths of natural
religion, or the competency of conscience to establish the principles of
natural morality. It is of the utmost consequence, for the interests of
revelation itself, to vindicate the independent validity, both of natural
theology and of natural ethics; to assert, not the sufficiency indeed, but the
legitimacy and trustworthiness, of the light of reason and the jurisdiction of
conscience.
2. In the second place, conscience, when once for all
satisfied that the Bible is the word of God, bows in lowliest reverence before
its paramount authority. She asks, and she has a right to ask, to be satisfied
that the Bible is the word of God. She asks this humbly and with docility -
feeling how much she would be the better for the guidance of Him who sees the
end from the beginning, who knows all things, and always judges right She asks
it calmly, dispassionately - calling in the help of manly reason to
authenticate the voice of the Sovereign Ruler. But being satisfied, she gladly
takes her place, beside her sister Faith, at the feet of Him who speaks from
heaven; of Him who, coming from heaven, speaks on earth, and speaks as one
having authority. She receives the law at his lips. She learns of him what
things are true, honest, just; what things are pure, lovely, of good report;
what virtue is, and what is praise. And if in any difficult or doubtful
instance, there occurs any apparent discrepancy between her conclusions and the
clear intimations of his mind, she remembers how an erring understanding, and a
wayward will, and her own infirmity or vice, make her judgments at the best but
probable, - fallible, even when it is the conduct of man that is judged, -
still more fallible when it is the conduct of God. And having confidence in the
rectitude, truth, and love of the great Being to whom she owns allegiance, -
for to none but a being possessed of these attributes would she, who approves
them so warmly herself, yield any homage, - she is content to acquiesce, to
adore, and to wait ; the rather when she hears such words as these: - What I
do, thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter.
3. In the
third place, Conscience looks to the Bible for an explanation of much, in the
present state of things, that she feels to be anomalous and inconsistent, or at
least incomprehensible. In vain does she look elsewhere for even a tolerable
guess upon the subject.
I cast my eye around the world, and long "for a
lodge in some vast wilderness." It is not merely that my heart bleeds at the
sight of suffering; my bosom swells under the sense of wrong. In the abodes of
squalid misery, in the very haunts of reckless crime, what cases innumerable
meet my view, not only of injustice at the hand of man, but, it would even
seem, of most unequal treatment at the hand of God! That shivering victim of
anothers lust; yonder little one, bred in filth and profligacy from the
cradle; the children of Africa, crushed into brutal apathy or lashed into
brutal madness; those sons and daughters of our own happier clime, that, by the
force of circumstances, amid the cankering, festering sores of our social
state, become well-nigh as degraded as they! Why are they what they are? What
makes them what they are? What chance had they of ever being otherwise? How can
these things be, and yet this goodly world be justly governed? Alas! it is
little wonder if a sullen fatallsm or an angry atheism, - begotten of sad
despair, and a vehement resentment of oppression, - reigns among the outcasts,
whom neither earth nor Heaven seems to pity! No wonder if, looking on,
conscience stands aghast, and feels as if she had no plea to urge in
justification of God, nor any word in season to speak to weary man! In vain you
tell her of general laws of righteousness and love, which, through inevitable
evil, are slowly and painfully working out the highest good. Bid her go with
that solution of the mystery into the streets, and see what a scowl of leering
contempt or exasperated rage darkens every brow. Let her take it into her own
study, and ponder it there: the memory of one beggar-boy, one thin and naked
girl, the gaunt face of famished manhood, the sigh of a wasted frame, the
sickening groan of a broken heart, - one such dismal vision will scatter
speculations by the thousand to the winds. It is darkness all - darkness more
than ever.
Conscience cannot say it is well, it is good, it is right.
But she opens her Bible; she learns there why the race of man is so miserable
as it is. Yes. And she learns there also why it is not more miserable still.
Sin has entered into the world, and so also has salvation. Sin has entered; it
has tainted deeply, it has doomed, the entire human family, and every member of
it. Hence these tears, these groans of creation. But salvation has entered too.
Hence these tears and groans are not yet, bitter as they are, what otherwise
they must have been, - what elsewhere, if not in one only way met and relieved
here, they must inevitably be, - "weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth,"
amid the irremediable anguish of "the worm that dieth not and the fire that is
not quenched." Struck and startled; struck with the truth of a representation
which, bringing so vividly out the sentence, the respite, the remedy, the
issue, really accounts at last for this condemned worlds, strange and sad
state; startled at the thought that, whio the respite lasts, the remedy is
available for every one, for any one, of its condemned inhabitants;-
conscience, the open Bible still in hand, rises in haste from her study, from
her knees, and rushes forth on the trembling wings of fear and love, to speak
of judgment and of mercy to whatever child of Adam she can reach to speak
affectionately, for the case is worse than had been thought; to speak wisely,
for there is need of delicacy; yet to speak earnestly, for the crisis is
urgent; to speak promptly and at once, for the time is short.
4. Once
more, in the fourth and last place, conscience finds in the Bible the solution
of a problem which vexes her not a little, - the reconciliation of law and
liberty. How may virtue or moral goodness possess that element of freedom, of
voluntary and spontaneous choice, which would seem to be essential, if it is to
be approved as venerable and lovely, and yet retain its original and inherent
character of obedience to law? There is difficulty in answering the question;
and, apart from the Bible, the difficulty may be pronounced insuperable. The
idea of law, and of the supremacy of law, however it may be acknowledged by
conscience, is irksome to the will. That masterful power is impatient of
subjection to another, and inclined to boast of what it wifi do if left to
itselE If it is to choose the good and reject the evil, it must be of its own
accord. To expect that it is to do so upon compulsion and by command, for
whatever reward or hire, and yet feel itself to be acting freely, is as
unreasonable as it would be to imagine that bribes and blows can give a sense
of liberty to the slave, as he drudges doggedly at his masters task. This
attitude of the will conscience is at a loss to meet She owns herself perplexed
and at fault. She cannot tame the proud spirit, or win its consent to be under
authority.
But she goes to the Bible, and there discovers the charm.
And the charm lies mainly in the insight which she gets into the heart of God,
whose holy nature the law expresses, whose just right of sovereignty the law
asserts. That great heart of the Eternal Father is opened up; in his Son. God
is light; God is love. That law which conscience binds me to acknowledge, the
everlasting God acknowledges too. It is the law of his will, and he will
himself see to it that it shall become the law of my will also. Yes; he will
himself see to it. For this end, he rights my position, my standing, in his
Son, and renovates my nature by his Spirit. The removal of the sentence of
condemnation, the passing of an opposite sentence in my favour, - a sentence of
acquittal, acceptance, justification;- all in terms of the law, perfectly
fulfilled, adequately satisfied; this amazing harmony of law and love in the
Fathers manner of dealing with me, as represented by his Son, disarms me.
My criminal grudge against law,. my servile jealousy of law, cannot stand out
against treatment like that. My whole soul undergoes a change The law is in my
heart, as it is in the heart of God. It is no more a yoke of bondage to me than
it is a yoke of bondage to him. Spontaneously, through his own Spirit moving
me, - more and more spontaneously as my hearb learns more and more to beat in
unison with his heart, - I do the things that are true, honest, just, pure,
love of good report, virtuous, praiseworthy And I do them in obedience to Him
whose service is perfect freedom whose law is the law of liberty.
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