Let it be understood then that it is the relation, or relations, in
which God stands to the other intelligences in the universe, that constitutes
the subject of my present inquiry. It is an inquiry which has respect to
relationship, and to that only.
I say relation, or relations. For one
point of inquiry, - and that a primary and principal one, - must be this : -
Are the relations in which God stands to the other intelligences in the
universe, manifold, and essentially distinct? Or may they all be ultimately
simplified and reduced into one?
That there is, and must be, a certain
thread of unity running through them all, and harrnonising them all, is
probable, a priori. It is probable, as a mere deduction or inference
from the unity of God ; the oneness of the Divine nature. And accordingly, it
may be anticipated that in the end or in the long run, - as the result or issue
of the actual dealings of God with the other intelligences in the universe, - a
unity of the strictest sort may come to prevail and be established, in the
final adjustment, whatever that may be, of the terms on which he and they are
to stand related towards one another for ever. It may not be the same unity for
all There may not be the same adjustment in respect for all. Undoubtedly two
opposite poles are indicated, not by Scripture only, but by reason and
conscience as well ; both of them simple enough; the one simply penal and
accursed; the other simply free and blessed: to one or other of which the
conflicting elements in the troubled chaos of created will appear to be all
tending. But that simplicity, whether as "a savour of life into life," or as "a
savour of death into death," is not yet. As things now are, a somewhat more
mixed and complex system of relationship would seem to be, if I may so speak,
the order of the day.
Certainly, common language suggests the idea of a
variety of relations being sustained by the Supreme towards subordinate
intelligences ; such as those of Creator, Preserver, Benefactor; Lawgiver,
Ruler, Judge; Friend, Father. Thus, one would say, the common sense of mankind
recognises cornplexity rather than simplicity; the manifold rather than the
one.
The enumeration which I have made of these relations may be too
manifold; too various and complex. Let that be at once admitted. Still, let my
enumeration be sifted and simplified over so carefully, it gives at all events
a threefold notion of what I may be allowed to call the normal Divine
relationship; meaning by that term, exhaustively, the entire relative position
which God occupies, or may occupy, with reference to his intelligent creatures,
considered simply as such.
First, there is the relation
springing out of the bare fact of creation ; a relation implying certainly
preservation and benefaction. The Creator, in virtue of his being their
creator, preserves and benefits his intelligent, as well as his other
creatures.
Secondly, there is the relation necessarily
constituted by the fact of the creation being a creation of intelligent and
responsible beings; a relation implying moral rule and government;
authoritative law and retributive judgment.
Thirdly, there is
the relation of which intelligent and responsible beings may fitly, though not
necessarily, be the objects ; - the relation of friendship, rising, it may be,
into fatherhood.
The popular mind, as it expresses itself in all
languages, recognises this threefold conception of God. The distinctions which
it involves, between the first view rising into the second and the second
culminating in the third, are of such a nature, and the sense of them is so
deeply rooted in the very constitution of all created intelligence, that
science, the most scientific, - system the most systematising - cannot be
allowed to overlook or disregard them; or so to aim at their obliteration as
absolutely to confound creation with government, - or creation and government
with friendship or fatherhood.
But another question here. May not these
relations involve one another, or run up into one another? May it not be the
case, first, that creation implies government and, secondly, that creation and
government necessarily imply friendship and fatherhood ? - necessarily, I mean,
in essential principle, as well as ultimately and practically, in actual result
or issue?
To a large extent, or rather indeed unreservedly, the former
of these two questions must be answered in the affirmative. Whatever God
creates, he must not only preserve and benefit, but also govern.
Let it
be observed, however, that this necessity does not arise out of any right which
creation may be supposed to give to the creature ; - any claim which the
creature, as such, may be imagined to have upon the Creator. Nor is it founded
upon any such right or claim. It arises solely out of the absolute sovereignty
of God, the Creator, and is founded entirely on that inherent and inalienable
prerogative of Deity. Whatever God as Creator makes he must rule. If it is not
to rule him, he must rule it. And he must rule it, in all its actings and
workings; through all the stages of its development.
And the rule must
always be, in a sense, by law and judgment. In a sense, I say, more or less
proper. For the nature of the law and judgment by means of which God rules must
correspond to the nature and constitution of the thing or being to be ruled. If
it is inert matter that is to be ruled, the law will be of a material or
physical kind, whether mechanical or chemical And the judgment, if it may be so
called, by which the law is enforced, will be the material or physical
disorganisation which any interference with its uniform and orderly working, or
any disregard of its uniform and orderly working, inevitably tends to cause.
Such interference or disregard, it is obvious, cannot come from inert matter
itself, but only from a living voluntary agent handling and using it. Upon the
living voluntary agent, therefore, the judgment, or quasi- judgment, falls.
Inert matter itself never is and never can be disobedient to the law by which
it is ruled; and consequently never can incur the penalty of disobedience.
But now, let what is to be ruled be, not inert matter, but beings
possessed of animal life, having the capacity of feeling and the power of
voluntary motion ; - with the sensational propensities which we class as
instinctive, and those dawnings of intelligence which, rendering them
teachable, look so marvellously like reason, as they are unfolded, in growing
shrewdness, from the lowest to the highest order of the brutal tribes. The sort
of law by which such beings are ruled, - the law of instinct, and it may be
added, in a measure, of experience, - is adapted to their sentient and motive
nature. It tells or operates upon them blindly; that is, without any
consciousness of it on their part, or any faculty of either assenting to it, or
dissenting from it. Nor are they more conscious of the judgment enforcing the
law, as judgment, than they are of the law as law. They receive good through
compliance with the law, whether the compliance be their own act or another's
act upon them, with equal unconcern. And so also, with equal unconcern, they
receive evil through the violation of the law, when either their own act, or
another's act towards them, is such as to make it work to their hurt. There is
an entire absence, equally in either case, of anything like the feeling of
moral obligation fulfilled or outraged ; of moral guilt and culpability avoided
or incurred.
That feeling is the exclusive property of intelligence,
when it rises to the possession of consciousness and of conscience;
consciousness of the personal self; conscience toward the personal God. And it
is that feeling which identifies and attests the peculiar character of the law
and judgment by means of which the Creator rules his really intelligent and
accountable creatures. His rule now becomes government, properly so called;
government worthy of himself; in full harmony with his own personal nature, and
with his ultimate purpose in creation, to have persons under his sway, with
whom he, as a person, may personally deal. It becomes a rational and moral
government, by means of a law and a judgment of which reason and the moral
sense take cognisance; a law, which the soul or spirit, consciously free,
voluntarily accepts or disowns; a judgment, which the soul or spirit,
consciously responsible, cannot but confess to be either the appropriate reward
of innocence or merit, or the deserved recompense of crime.
Thus it
would seem that, from the very nature of the case, creation implies rule and
government. The Creator must, of very necessity, be a ruler and governor;
unless his own creation is to be independent of himself. And as regards his
intelligent creatures, his rule or government must be, in the proper forensic
sense, legal and judicial, if it is to be adapted to the constitution and
relative position of the persons who are to be governed. Only thus can He rule
them as really persons.
For the same reason also, it is a matter of
necessity, as regards himself, that the Creator's rule or government shall be
absolute and sovereign. This is a capital point in the argument from creation
to government; which must be clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view. If
it is as Creator that he rules and governs, - if it is as His own creatures
that he rules and governs all things, all animals, all persons in the universe,
- by whatever sort of law, by whatever sort of judgment, accommodated to their
several natures, - it is not possible to conceive otherwise of his dominion
than that it is of the most thoroughly royal, imperial, autocratic kind. For it
is the dominion of him to whom all creation belongs. It is the dominion of him
who must, if he is to be God, be supreme over all. It is the dominion of him to
whom this worship belongs: "Thou, Lord, hast created
all things, and for thy pleasure they are and they were created" (Rev. iv.
ll).
Now, if this is at all a right view of the original
relation of God to his created intelligences,- the relation necessarily
constituted by creation, and necessarily implied in creation, - where is the
idea of fatherhood? Is there, at this stage, and so far as the inquiry has been
hitherto pushed, any room for it at all? Is it not rather excluded? Has that
great thought any place among those original, fundamental, primary, and
elemental conceptions of the connection between the Creator and his intelligent
creatures, which must lie at the very root and foundation of all religion, and
must enter into its heart's core ; - at least if it is to be theistic and
monotheistic ? Set pantheism and polytheism apart. Let the proper personality
of the one only living and true God be assumed. Let it be taken for granted
that the Creator is a living, personal intelligence, distinct from his own
creation ; and in particular, distinct from his own intelligent creatures, who
are themselves, as he is, living, personal intelligences. It may be clearly
shown and certainly inferred that he must, as Creator, govern them ; and govern
them in a manner suited to their organisation or constitution, as that of
beings made capable of owning righteous authority and reasonable law, and
therefore capable of receiving recompense or retribution. Standing to them in
the relation of their creator, he must of necessity stand to them in the
relation, as thus explained, of their ruler; their sovereign law-giver and just
judge. These apprehensions of God, and of his relation to the rational and
responsible inhabitants of his universe, are of the essence of all belief in
him, and all worship of him. They originate, and what is more, they fully
explain and vindicate, both belief and worship. But the paternal relation, the
fatherhood of God, has no place among them.
Let the precise question
here at issue be carefully cleared and ascertained. It is not a question about
the existence of a certain attribute in God, such as goodness, kindness, pity,
sympathy. Nor is it a question about the sentiments and feelings which God may
be supposed to entertain towards the beings whom He has made, and which He may
express or embody in his actual dealings with them. The question is much more
precise and definite. It is about the existence of a certain positively real
and actual relation of fatherhood and sonship, between the Creator and his
intelligent creatures; such a relation as, like all real and actual relations,
implies this at least, that in virtue of it, certain specific reciprocal
obligations, of a peculiar nature, are incumbent on the parties embraced in it,
- having certain specific reci procal rights, privileges, and endearments
associated with them. It is not a divine feeling that may be called fatherly, -
as it might be equally well named from some other kindly human analogy, - that
we are in search of; but a real and actual divine fatherhood. We want not
merely one who, in his other relations, acts as far as possible a fatherly part
towards - but one who is in fact our father.
If any choose to say that
fatherhood is simply origination, - that the essence of it lies in being the
cause or occasion of a new living person beginning to exist in the universe, -
that paternity consists in bringing a new living person, whether instrumentally
or otherwise, on the stage of the universe, and in that alone; that it is that,
and nothing more ; - then of course creation and paternity are identical. God,
simply as creator, is the father of all his creatures. But, not to speak of the
obvious difficulty that this establishes somewhat too wide a fatherhood, since
it makes it comprehensive, not only of all the higher intelligences, however
ultimately sunk and lost ; - for fatherhood by creation can scarcely be
conceived of otherwise than as natural, necessary, and inalienable ; - but also
of others besides, who may be still less welcome associates ; - who does not
see that it really evacuates the idea of fatherhood altogether of any precise
or definite meaning; making the name little more than a euphonious synonym, or
figurative personification, for causation; and in truth denying that there is
any real paternal relation on the part of God at all!
Nor will it avail
to hold, by way of limitation and definition, that it is his creating them "in
his own image, after his own likeness," that constitutes the Creator to be also
the father of the higher intelligences ; - as if his fatherhood consisted in
his being the originatiug cause of new beings like himself coming into
exjstence. For this only brings us back to the former inquiry, What is it, as
regards the relation between God and them, that their being thus created "in
his image and after his likeness" necessarily involves? It can scarcely be
proved to involve any more than this; that they are capable of understanding
his will, feeling their free responsibility under it, and receiving reward or
punishment in terms of it. His government of them therefore must be of a
reasonable and moral character; by means of a reasonable, moral law, having
annexed to it suitable and corresponding judicial awards. If the relation of
fatherhood arises out of the fact of creation, it may be admitted that, in the
case of intelligent creatures, it involves that. But it cannot be shown to
involve more than that. And really, if that is all, the fatherhood of God, I
repeat, is but a name. It is little, if anything, more than a mere figure of
speech. For it cannot, in my judgment, be too strongly asserted, that among the
primary and original elements of our relational conception of God, there is
absolutely no trace of anything peculiar in the constitution and condition of
his rational, as distinct from his other creatures, beyond the bare fact of
intelligent responsibility.
Nay, not only so. There is absolutely no
room, no place, for anything more. The intrusive introduction of anything more
deranges and disturbs the whole great economy of creation. The notion of the
Creator's government of the very highest of his intelligent creatures being
anything else, in its principle and ideal, than simply and strictly legal and
judicial, is, as it respects the radical and essential relation of Creator and
creature, an inconsistency ; an intolerable anomaly ; a suicidal self-
contradiction. Were it admitted it must break down, - so far as it is admitted,
it does tend to break down, the vast, infinite distance that should ever be
felt to subsist between the Creator and the creature. It is fatal to the real
recognition of absolute sovereignty on the one hand, and absolute dependence
and subjection on the other. It introduces necessarily the idea of some sort of
intermediate relative position, modifying and qualifying the Creator's
sovereignty and the creature's subjection; as if the Creator owed something to
the creature beyond strict legal justice ; and as if the creature had some
right or claim, irrespective of mere legal justice, which he might assert, if
not against, yet at least upon, the Creator. A paternal government, in any fair
and full sense of the term, imagined to spring out of the mere fact of
creation, or to he implied in it, must be fatal to the prerogative of God the
Creator ; and therefore also fatal to the true happiness, because fatal to the
right position, of his intelligent creatures. It could only be realised by
their being as gods themselves.
Let it be settled, then, as a great
fundamental truth, that on whatever other ground the relation of fatherhood in
God may rest, and in whatever other sphere of divine operation or creature
experience it may unfold itself, - it cannot have its rise in creation, and
cannot have its place in that rule or government which is consequent upon
creation. Let there be no confounding of things separate and distinct.
Government by law and judgment is one thing; fatherhood is somethixig
altogether different. It is only by keeping them quite apart in our conceptions
of them that we can do justice to both. It is only thus that we can conserve
the sovereignty inalienable from the one, and give full and free scope for all
the affection which is the peculiar glory of the other. And it is only thus
that we prepare the way for the harmonious adjustment of the two, in the
complete development of the gospel plan, - for their being so married that
"what God hath joined, man may not put asunder."
But, while it is
maintained that the only proper and original idea of the relation in which the
Creator stands to his intelligent creatures, - the only idea necessarily
involved in his having made them, and made them such as they are, - is that of
rule or government by law and judgment, - it by no means follows that there may
not have been from the first indications pointing to the higher relation of
fatherhood, and a foundation, as it were, laid for its subsequent adjustment
and development. On the contrary, the fact revealed in Holy Scripture of the
agency of the Eternal Son in the creative work, coupled with what is not
obscurely intimated as having been the design of that arrangement, - the
glorifying of the Son through the unfolding of his filial oneness with the
Father, - would seem to make it not unreasonable to expect that in the original
constitution, mental and spiritual, of the higher intelligences there should be
found some aptness, at least, for realising the great divine ideal, and taking
on the impress or image of it; or in other words, that they should be found so
constituted from the first as to be capable of apprehending the paternal aspect
of the divine character and administration, when made known to them, - and
capable also of entering themselves, in due time and on due warrant, into that
state or standing with reference to God, for which the apprehension of his
fatherhood may open up the way. These are subjects of inquiry which must come
up afterwards. For the present, it is enough to observe that in whatever manner
and in whatever measure the notion of God being a Father, - and more
particularly, the notion of their being personally interested in his being a
Father, - may be supposed to have dawned on the minds of the intelligences,
this must have always appeared to them and been felt by them to be something
quite distinct from their primary, normal relation to ,him as their moral
ruler; something superadded to that relation, or superinduced upon it, and not
to be either identified or confounded with it. His being a Father to them, if
they rightly reflected on their true position, must have been regarded as a
pure and simple act of grace; not an essential element of their creature state
or condition ; not discoverable by them as creatures through any inference or
deduction from the fact of their being creatures ; to be known therefore only
by direct communication from God himself, who alone is competent, in the
exercise of his mere and sovereign good pleasure, to determine, and
consequently to unfold, the nature and the terms of the relation which it
indicates.
These conclusions, as it seems to me, are applicable to the
intelligent creatures of God, as such; and to all of them; not merely to the
guilty and fallen, but to the innocent and unfallen also. There may indeed be a
loose and vague sense in which, for popular or poetic uses, the holy angels may
be said to be the sons of God by their creation or from their creation; and man
may be spoken of as having been a child of God in Paradise before he lost by
his trangression his original standing there. Even if it could be established
as a theological truth or a historical fact, that God was pleased to regard and
treat these innocent subjects of his rule as sons from the very beginning of
their existence, still it must be maintained that his doing so was simply an
exercise of his own free discretion; that it was no necessary inference from,
no necessary consequence of, his having created them such as he did create
them; that it was a distinct and independent benefit, posterior to creation, in
the order of nature, though, on the supposition now made, simultaneous in point
of time. I am persuaded, however, that there is really no valid proof or
sufficient presumption, either in natural religion or in the word of God, in
favour of that idea. I do not think that there is in either any trace of
sonship constituted at creation , any more than there is of sonship constituted
by creation . This also may be matter of future investigation.
There is
one deduction from the views advocated in this lecture to which before I leave
the subject I must ask particular attention; for it seems to me to be
all-important.
If I am right in holding that any relation of fatherhood
into which God may be pleased to enter towards his intelligent creatures must
be, in the sense now explained, posterior to the original relation which he
sustains, as being their Ruler, in virtue of being their Maker, - then it
clearly follows that the former relation, the paternal, cannot be allowed to
supersede, or even to modify the latter, the governmental. That prior relation
is a necessity of nature, if one may so speak, and not a discretionary
arrangement. The mere existence of intelligent creatures involves their
subjection to rule by law and judgment. Their creator, if his sovereignty in
his own creation, and over it, is to be, as it must be, absolute and
inviolable, cannot but so govern them. And he must continue so to govern them,
whatever other relation he may think fit to assume or to announce. That other
relation, of whatever character it may be, and however originated, cannot be
conceived of as making any change in the conditions of the primary relation.
For if it did, it must be through their ceasing to be creatures and God ceasing
to be their Creator.. A monstrous imagination ! - to which however I must feel
myself to be literally shut up, if I am asked to make the fatherhood of God the
all in all of my religion.
I contend earnestly for the distinction of
the two relations. Neither must be suffered to override the other. Neither must
be merged or sunk in the other. It is one thing for me to have God as my ruler,
lawgiver, judge. It is another, and an altogether different thing for me to
have him as my Father. What the points of difference are, it would be
premature, at this stage, to discuss. But I may briefly refer to two of them,
as illustrating the importance of our keeping the relations in question quite
apart, in all our conceptions and reasonings regarding them.
Rightly
understood, as it seems to me, the paternal relation, in the first place,
implies the enjoyment by those towards whom it is sustained of a permanent
footing in the family, as opposed to one that is contingent and precarious
(John viii. 35). And secondly, in consequence of its implying this, it excludes
the idea of punishment, properly so called; admitting only that of chastisement
(Heb. xii.) It is not the function of a father, as such, to try, or put upon
probation. It is not his function to inflict a penal or retributive doom. But
these are functions of that rule or government by law and judgment which God
the Creator exercises and must ever exercise. Surely there is here a line of
distinction and demarcation that is sufficiently clear, and that ought to be
kept clear. For observe what follows if it is obliterated or lost sight of. Let
the view which some extreme lovers of simplicity would advocate be adopted. Let
God be simply a Father, and his government simply fatherly. Let all his
administrative acts be held to be done by him as the Father of his creatures.
Then this dilemma immediately presents itself Either, on the one hand, you must
include among the actings of a father, in his paterna1 character, the imposing
of an arbitrary or discretionary conditional test and the inflicting of penal
judgment; in which case, you make fatherhood little more than a name ;
descriptive, perhaps, and suggestive of the general benevolence which may be
supposed to temper the severity of strict rule ; but not otherwise significant
of any special affection, or any special mode of treatment. Or else, on the
other hand, giving to fatherhood its full and true meaning, and maintaining it
to be wholly and exclusively a relation of pure fatherly love, you deny, and
consistently deny, that one who sustains that relation, and governs according
to it, can test in the exercise of sovereignty or punish in the execution of
judgment. Probation, and especially retribution, in the true and proper sense,
become thus impossible.
Let a merely human instance, in contrast with a
divine ordinance, be referred to, in explanation and confirmation of my
opinion, as to the evil and danger of confounding the two relations.
In
the Roman law, the authority of a father over his children was the very same,
in nature and extent with the authority of the civil magistrate. The Roman
father had the power of life and death over his son. He was irresponsible in
the exercise of his power. No other power, not even the magistrate's, could
interfere with his. Nay more, he had a right to demand that his son, even when
a public accusation was brought against him, should be handed over by the
magistrate to the parent, for tbe trial of the case and the execution of the
sentence. Thus in Roman law, the functions of ruler and judge were mixed up
with those of father. And with what result? Surely, as every reader of history
knows, with sad damage to the one relation which is the source and centre of
all the sacred tenderness of home; and with no corresponding benefit, in
respect of strength or stability, to the other, on which the leal-hearted,
patriotic, public spirit of the true citizen must rest. The Roman knew no
substantial difference between his relation to his father and his relation to
the state. Domestic affection was thus weakened, almost to extinction ; while,
to say the least, the spirit of loyal subordination to law and its awards was
not greatly strengthened.
In marked contrast with the Roman law, the
Jewish law on this subject may be quoted. It draws the distinction for which I
plead in a most unmistakable and emphatic way. "If a
man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his
father or the voice of his mother; and that, when they have chastised him, will
not hearken unto them, then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him,
and bring him out imto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place ;
and they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn and
rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard. And all
the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die" (Deut.
xxi. 18-21).
What can be clearer or more admirable than the distinction
here drawn between the paternal and the judicial? The limit of fatherly
authority and fatherly discipline is pointedly marked. It reaches to
chastisement, - " when they have chastised
him," - but there it stops. The rebel passes from the familiar house
and warm heart of a loving and brokenhearted father, who has done his utmost
and whose utmost has failed, - to the cold, calm tribunal of "the gate of his place ;" the awful seat of judgment;
there to be judicially tried by "the elders of his
city," and thence to be delivered over, for judicial execution, to
the appointed ministers of the last sentence of the law.
I cannot stay
to show the working and effect of this divine ordinance among the Jews, as
contrasted with the working and effect of the merely human legislation of the
Romans. With all their faults, I do not know that the Jews have ever been
chargeable with want of family affection. Nor may their national loyalty be
lightly called in question. All that it concerns me, for my present purpose, to
insist upon, is the careful discrimination which the Jewish law makes between
the parent and the magistrate; between the relation in which a son stands to
his father, and the relation in which he stands to "the elders of his city." Nor would I press the
analogy too far. One qualification at least is needed; and it is a material
one.
Among the Jews, as indeed ordinarily among all the nations of
mankind, the two characters or relations, the parental and the judicial, are in
separate hands. They belong to separate and distinct parties. The father and
the magistrate are two different persons. And in the order of nature and of
natural development the father comes first. He first makes proof of his
paternal relation, before he hands over his son, as a subject, to the
magisterial ruler and judge. It is otherwise in the divine economy to which
this analogy may be applied. There, the two relations are sustained by one and
the same being; the one Supreme God, who is both ruler and father.
Nor
is he quite in the position of that Roman father who, being also judge, when
his own son appeared at his bar, had either to pronounce the inevitable
sentence of condemnation against the criminal - or to satisfy outraged justice
by giving himself to suffer along with him, or to suffer instead of him. In the
case of fallen man, the Creator, as governor and judge, sees before his
tribunal, not a disobedient son, but simply a rebellious creature and subject.
He sees indeed a creature whom he meant to be his son; whom he made to be his
son. And so far, in that view, his regrets and longings are those of a
deeply-disappointed father. But the criminal at his bar is not his son ; - as
he was not his son before he became a criminal He has no filial standing; no
filial rights or claims. He is simply a creature and a subject.
No
doubt his Creator, having intended originally to adopt and own him as a son, -
after probation probably as a subject, - may be pleased to draw near to him,
even when upon probation he has failed and fallen, in a way indicative of that
original intention; and may show his willingness to welcome him, on his return,
with the fulness of the parental love and the parental blessing which he meant
him from the first to possess ; - for which indeed, I repeat, He made him. Even
this, however, implies a very special and peculiar manner of dealing, on the
part of the Creator, with his fallen creature; the rebellious and guilty
subject of his government.
For the difficulty of combining the paternal
element with government properly so called, - or introducing it as a modifying
or mollifying infiuence, - is very great. It is found to be so, when the
attempt is made in human affairs; in the administration of the kingdoms of this
world.
A paternal government! A king or an emperor the father of his
people! A supreme Court of Parliament legislating paternally! A bench of
magistrates or judges awarding paternal sentences! These are fine ideals. But
how, in its application to facts, is the theory of the ruler in the state,
ruling as a father, apt, and almost sure, to work? It will turn out for the
most part to err, both by excess and by defect. It errs by excess ; for it is
apt to become too paternal in the administration of law and justice. It
substitutes discipline for punishment; the rod for the sword. It errs by
defect; for after all it falls far short of what a fatherly discipline would
really require. It does not and cannot wield the rod with the discrimination
and discretion which the use of it, as a fatherly instrument, requires; and
which only the intimate familiarity of minute home-inspection, and constant
home-fellowship, can enable a parent to exercise. It is ordinarily better,
therefore, on the whole, that the magistrate should be content with the
enforcing of his magisterial authority; under such influences as the general
principle of benevolence may suggest. He cannot safely or usefully unite in
himself the relation of ruler and that of father.
To do so is
pre-eminently the glory of God. And it is his glory in his Son Jesus Christ. It
is his having it in his power, if one may so say, to manifest and reveal a
relation of fatherhood altogether distinct from the relation constituted by
creation, - though closely connected with it, - that solves the difficulty and
explains the mystery. He "bringeth in the first-
begotten into the world" (Heb. i. 6). Sitting on the throne of
sovereign and universal dominion, he does not, in fond and weak pity, sink the
character of the righteous ruler in that of the relenting father. But he
introduces his Son his co-equal, co-substantial, only-begotten, well-beloved
Son. And he proclaims his purpose, to make all his intelligent creatures, if
they will, his sons in Him.
Are they to whom the proclamation comes
innocent and upright, - proved to be so by a sufficient test of their loyalty
to their Creator as their righteous Lord? For them, it might seem that the mere
discovery of this divine relation of fatherhood, - coupled with the asurance
that it admitted of their being, so far as their nature is capable of such
elevation, comprehended in its wide embrace, - would suffice to make them,
without their ceasing to be subjects, sons, in and with "the first-begotten."
Is it, on the other
hand, to creatures guilty and depraved that the proclamation comes? Alas! it
is, as it might seem, all in vain. For in their case also it is a fixed
principle, that if they are to be made sons, it must be without their ceasing
to he subjects. But as subjects, they are helplessly and hopelessly condemned.
They have violated law, and are doomed to the penalty annexed to its violation.
They are moreover incapable of obedience to law; their carnal mind being enmity
against God, the lawgiver. How then, continuing subjects, can they ever become
sons?
How otherwise than by the wondrous provision of divine grace,
according to which he in whom they are to be sons undertakes to right their
position as subjects? First he deals with their case as it stands in law. They
are condemned criminals at the bar of the righteous judge. He joins them there.
He sists himself and takes his place beside them; not to plead in extenuation
of their crime, or for mitigation of their punishment; for indulgence; for
impunity; but as their substitute, to answer for them; to take upon his own
head their guilt and doom, that a righteous sentence of legal and judicial
acquittal may, by the Father's grace, be freely theirs. So he clears the way.
So, being justified in the relation in which they stand as subjects under law
to God their ruler and judge, they may pass into that new and divine relation
in which they are to stand for ever; the relation of which Christ spoke when he
sent the message from his empty sepulchre, "Go to my
brethren and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my
God and your God" (John xx. 1~7).
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