William
Cunningham
A Lecture delivered by Dr. Cunningham
at the
opening of the Session of the New College, in November 1851.
Relation Between Church and State
The relation
that ought to subsist between the state and the church, or between the civil
and the ecclesiastical authorities, as representing and regulating them, has
been a subject of controversial discussion since the time of the Emperor
Constantine; and there are some important questions involved in the discussion
of it, which still divide men whose opinions are entitled to the highest
deference and respect. These differences are not merely theoretical, but have
produced important practical results in all ages, and even in our own day; and
are likely to continue to exert an important influence upon the actual
condition of the world.
The subject is now, much more than in any former
age, forced upon the attention of statesmen, as involving practical questions
which they are called upon to solve, and the right solution of these questions
would introduce very important changes. All the erroneous views and practices
upon this subject which have at any time appeared in the world are still to be
found in it. Even persecution for conscience sake is not yet wholly banished
from civilized countries, or confined to those in which the Church of Rome is
predominant; and in all Protestant countries the civil powers have usurped, and
the established churches have consented to, an exercise of authoritative
control by the state, inconsistent with scriptural views of the functions of
the civil government, and with the rights and liberties of the church of
Christ.
We assume at present that the duties and functions, the rights and
privileges, of the state and the church, or of the civil and the ecclesiastical
authorities, are to be determined by the word of God, in so far as it contains
materials bearing upon these points. The church is a supernatural institution,
having direct relation exclusively to men's spiritual and eternal interests;
and we can know nothing certainly about it except from the supernatural
revelation which God has given us in His word. It is otherwise with the state
of civil government. This is intended to bear at least principally and most
directly, upon the temporal welfare of men, and ought to be regulated chiefly
by a regard to the principles of natural reason. God has not prescribed His
written word as the only rule to be followed by nations and their rulers in
establishing and administering civil government; and He has not given them in
His word sufficient materials to guide them authoritatively in determining all
the questions which, with reference to this matter, they may be called upon to
entertain and dispose of.
But it is not on this account the less true, that
there are materials in the word of God which do bear upon the functions and
duties of nations and their rulers, and that these relevant materials ought to
be applied by them as authoritative in regulating their conduct. Some things,
then, respecting the functions and duties of nations and their rulers, are to
be learned from Scripture; and everything that determines the obligations and
procedure of churches, and of those who represent and regulate them, is to be
ascertained from that source.
At present, however, we have to do, not with
the whole of what is taught or prescribed in Scripture concerning the state and
the church, or concerning civil and ecclesiastical government, but only with so
much of it as bears upon the relation that ought to subsist between them; and,
even under this head, chiefly with what relates to the peculiar testimony which
the Free Church of Scotland has been called upon to bear. The substance of what
is generally regarded as taught in Scripture with respect to civil government,
including the relative duties of rulers and subjects, is set forth in the
Confessions of the Reformed churches, and in the old systems of theology, under
the head, De Magistratu. By the magistrate, or the civil magistrate, in
this connection, is of course meant the party, whether one or many, possessed
of the supreme civil power, and entitled to frame the laws, and to regulate
ultimately the whole proceedings of a nation. It is only this supreme
legislative power, of whatever parties it may be composed, that comes directly
and immediately into contact with the word of God as its rule or standard; all
inferior authorities, even the highest executive and judicial functionaries,
being bound to regulate their procedure by the existing constitution and laws
of the nation; by the provisions which the civil magistrate, that is the nation
acting by its highest organ, has established.
About the duties and
functions of nations, or of the civil magistrate as the party entitled to enact
national laws, and to regulate national affairs; in other words, about the
origin, the objects, and ends of civil government and civil magistracy, the
word of God gives us some information; and by this information, carefully
investigated and accurately ascertained, nations and their rulers ought to be
guided.
The chief topics under this general head, which have been discussed
in relation to our present subject, are these:
1. What is implied in civil
government being, as it is generally admitted to be, an ordinance of God? and
2., Whether the promotion of religion, or the advancement of the spiritual
welfare of the community, be one of its direct and proper ends?
These
questions have been largely discussed, especially in our own day, in connection
with the subject of the lawfulness and practicability of some union or friendly
alliance between church and state, the warrantableness and the obligation of
the civil magistrate aiming, in the execution of the functions of his office,
at the prosperity of the church of Christ and the welfare of true religion. If
civil government be an ordinance of God in some higher and more definite sense
than merely this, that it is the natural appropriate result of the constitution
which God has given to men, and of the ordinary providence which He exercises
over them, as Scripture seems plainly enough to intimate, then this decidedly
favours the idea that the state, acting through its organs, should recognize
its responsibility to God, and should co-operate with the church in promoting
his cause, and advancing the welfare of religion. If the promotion of religion,
the advancement of the spiritual welfare of the community be one of the proper
objects or ends of civil government, then this at once goes far to establish
the truth of what has been called the establishment principle, as opposed to
the voluntary principle; for, upon this assumption, it seems impossible to
dispute that civil rulers, in the execution of their functions, are called upon
to aim at the promotion of true religion according to the word of God; and with
this view, to enter into a friendly union or alliance with the church of
Christ; unless indeed, upon the ground that the constitution and functions of
the church preclude this.
It is important however, to notice that in order
to uphold the principle of national establishments of religion, it is not
indispensable to establish any particular views of what is implied in civil
government being an ordinance of God, or to show that the promotion of religion
is one of its proper objects or ends. For even though the possession of civil
authority were regarded merely in the vague and general aspect of a talent or
means of influence, the establishment principle might be shown to derive some
countenance from the general obligation attaching to all men, in all
circumstance to employ all their talents for the promotion of God's glory and
the advancement of his cause. And if it were conceded that the proper direct
end of civil government is only the temporal and not the spiritual welfare of
the community, it would still be quite competent to argue, and not difficult to
prove. -
First, that civil rulers are called upon to aim at the promotion of
religion as the best and only certain means of advancing the temporal welfare
of their subject: And
secondly, that though the promotion of religion is
not an end of civil government, it is yet an end which civil governors, in the
execution of their official function, may be called upon to aim at; or to use
one of those scholastic distinctions which so frequently throw light upon an
intricate subject, though not finis operis [the aim of the work], it may
yet be the finis operantis [the aim of the proceedings].
On this
ground, the doctrine that the promotion of the temporal welfare of the
community is the only proper direct end of civil government has been held by
many of the advocates of the principle of national establishments of religion,
and indeed by men of all varieties of opinion upon the different topics
involved in this general subject; by Cardinal Bellarmine and other Popish
writers, who wished to depress the dignity, and to pave the way for its
subjection to the authoritative control of the church; by George Gillespie and
the old Scotch and Dutch Presbyterian divines, who contended against the
opposite doctrine when brought forward as an argument in favour of the right of
the civil power to interfere authoritatively in the regulation of
ecclesiastical affairs.
The doctrine that the promotion of the spiritual
welfare of the community is one of the proper ends of civil government, has
been employed by Erastians as a basis for the position that the state ought to
exercise authoritative control over the church. The opposite doctrine, that the
temporal welfare of the community is the only end of civil government, has been
employed by the advocates of voluntarism as a basis for the position that the
civil magistrate, as such, has no duty or obligation in reference to religion,
and is not called upon to aim at promoting the prosperity of the church.
We
believe that both these positions are unfounded, and we are confident that
neither of them can be fairly deduced from the particular doctrines (opposed to
each other) with respect to the objects and ends of civil government on which
they are respectively based. We have already explained the process by which,
notwithstanding the admission that the temporal welfare of the community is the
only direct and proper end of civil government, the principle of National
Establishments may be defended against its opponents; and the process by which
Erastiansism may be excluded, notwithstanding the admission that the promotion
of religion is one of the ends of civil government, is by showing that the
magistrate's obligation to promote religion does not imply that he has a right
of authoritative control in ecclesiastical matters.
Even if it were assumed
that Scripture has not settled the precise question whether the promotion of
religion is, or is not, one of the primary and direct ends of civil government,
we can see our way to a proof of all that we believe to be true, and to a
disproof of all that we believe to be erroneous, in regard to the relation that
ought to subsist between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, without
needing to assume as established either side of this alternative.
There is
much more information given us in scripture concerning the church than
concerning the state; and it is indeed from Scripture alone that we can know
anything about the church; its definition, nature, constitution, objects, and
ends. The teaching of Scripture on the subject of the church forms an important
department in Christian Theology. Even the right scriptural definition of the
church has been the subject of much controversial debate, and the settlement of
this point is of fundamental importance in some of our leading discussions with
the Romanists.
In so far as concerns our present subject of the relation
that ought to subsist between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities, the
chief topic to be examined is the constitution and government of the church as
a distinct society. That the church of Christ is, by the ordination of its
founder, a society, that is, a regulated union or combination of many, for the
promotion of common objects and interests, is very clearly taught in Scripture,
and is indeed plainly implied in all the representations given us there of the
kingdom of Christ, and of the parts or sections of which it is composed. This
indeed, is generally admitted, and can scarcely be said to have at any time
proved a subject of controversy.
The church is also represented in
Scripture as a society distinct from the kingdoms of this world, and as
differing essentially from them in its whole character and qualities. This
appears plainly from all that Scripture tells us concerning its origin and
ends, its author and objects, its constitution and government, its office
bearers and members, the standard by which its affairs ought to be regulated,
and the qualifications of those who do or should compose it.
The
distinction or diversity between the Church of Christ and the kingdoms of this
world in these various important respects is also generally admitted.
Differences of opinion have, however, arisen as to the necessity of the
permanence of this distinction in all circumstances, and as to some of the
indifferences that may be deduced from it. To understand the discussions which
have taken place upon these points, it will be proper to observe that the
Scripture sets before us a visible Catholic church, consisting of all those
throughout the world who profess the true religion, together with their
children; and likewise a number of churches, distinguished from each other,
having each its own individuality, but all of them parts or branches of the one
visible Catholic church.
We have nothing to do at present with the position
which the Congregationalists maintain in opposition to all other sections of
Christians, namely, that upon scriptural principles a church can be only a
single congregation. We assume at present, what we think we can prove, the
truth of the position laid down in our form of church government; namely that
the Scripture does hold forth that many particular congregations may be under
one presbyterial government, and that of course all the Christian congregations
of a district or kingdom may be so combined and united together under one
government as to form one church. What we wish especially to notice in
connection with this matter is this, that the leading views taught in Scripture
with respect to the church, that is, the visible Catholic church viewed as a
whole, apply equally in substance to any church; that is, to any portion or
section of the whole church to which the designation of a church may be
legitimately applied. Whatever is prescribed in Scripture to the visible church
as a whole, or as one organized society, in regard to its constitution, laws,
and government, its relations to Christ, or to the kingdoms of this world, is
equally binding upon every church; that is, upon every section of professing
Christians, whether consisting of one congregation or of many united under one
government, which assumes to itself the designation of a church.
The
assumption of this character and designation by any organization of professing
Christians, larger or smaller, at once imposes upon it an obligation, resting
upon divine authority, to conform in all respects to what Scripture teaches
concerning the duties and functions, the laws and arrangements, of the distinct
kingdom which Christ has established. This is a principle of some importance,
and admits of obvious and extensive application. The church of Christ, as it is
represented in Scripture, being distinct, and in many important respects
formerly referred to, different, from the kingdoms of this world, every church
is bound to retain this distinctness and diversity, and cannot disregard or
abandon it without acting unfaithfully to Christ. No change of circumstances
can legitimately transmute a church of Christ into a civil society, into a
kingdom of this world, or exempt it from its obligation to maintain fully its
peculiar distinctive characters and arrangements as they are set forth in
Scripture.
Some have contended that when the supreme civil power of a
kingdom professes subjection to Christ's authority, and a willingness to aid or
co-operate in carrying out the designs of the church, and especially if the
whole or the chief parts of the population should become members of the church,
and that the only church in the community, that then the distinctive character
of the church as a separate society is virtually sunk in that of a Christian
state, with which it then becomes identified. This notion or something like it
(for it is generally put forth very vaguely and obscurely), has been employed
by many writers as a ground for investing civil rulers with an authoritative
control over the church's affairs, and reducing the church to a condition of
entire subordination to the state; and it has been employed by Dr. Arnold for
the more honourable purpose, (though the practical result is substantially the
same), of exalting and refining the objects and aims of the civil power.
With whatever views this notion may be advocated, it is in itself
fundamentally erroneous, implying a disregard at least, if not a denial, of the
whole substance of what Scripture teaches concerning the church, upon the
principle formerly explained; and, of course, concerning all the parts or
sections of which it is composed. Christ has made His church distinct and
diverse from the kingdoms of this world; and distinct and diverse it must
continue, if it would not change its whole character, and abandon entirely the
relation in which it stands to Him. Civil rulers, by becoming Christian, and
setting about the discharge of the duties which the word of God imposes upon
them in reference to religion or the church, do not acquire any right or
authority which they had not before, and do not become entitled to alter the
constitution and laws of the church, or to assume any authoritative control in
the regulation of its affairs. The church is not warranted, on the ground of
any obedience justly due to civil rulers, or in return for any favours which it
may receive from them, to alter, or to consent to the alteration of, any of the
characters which Christ has impressed upon it, or of the arrangements which He
has established in regard to it.
Every feature in the scriptural definition
and description of the church implies its essential and permanent distinctness
from the kingdoms of this world. Even if the whole community were members of
the church, and of one and the same church, this could be regarded only as an
accidental condition of things that could not be expected to last for any
length of time, and if it should last, would afford no warrant for disregarding
or setting aside Christ's arrangements. Although the church and the
commonwealth consist of the same persons, it would still, if Christ's
arrangements as set forth in Scripture were to be at all regarded, be by a
different constitution and laws. That men held their places in the one or in
the other, whether as office-bearers or as members, and thy would still have in
these two different capacities different duties to discharge, and a different
standard to follow.
Nothing indicates that it was Christ's intention that
the constitution and arrangements of His church should be altered when His
religion should gain an ascendency in a nation. Everything indicates the
reverse. He is to be with His church, and His church is to be with Him, that
is, subject to His control, obedient to His direction, submissive to His will,
faithful in discharging the duties He has imposed, until the end of the world.
A mere change in the external condition of the church, arising from the
proceedings of civil rulers professing to discharge a scriptural duty, is a
fundamentally different thing from an alteration in any of those matters which
manifestly constitute essential features of the church as a distinct society,
of the arrangements He made for the administration of its government, and the
regulation of its affairs. The classes and qualifications of office-bearers,
the nature and limits of their authority and functions, the qualifications and
privileges of ordinary members, and the superintendence to be exercised over
them by the office-bearers, are manifestly among the essentialia of a distinct
organized society, and cannot be materially changed without changing its
constitution and character. Christ has settled these points for His church in
His word; while in regard to civil society nations are left free to settle most
of these matters according to their own judgment and discretion; and from the
nature of the case, there are many of them which cannot be settled in civil
society in the way in which Christ has settled them in His church.
On such
grounds as these, it can be easily shown that the distinctness and diversity
between the church, as settled by Christ, and the kingdoms of this world, must
be permanently maintained; and that their complete organization, as distinct
societies, cannot be infringed upon without sin on the part of those concerned
in it, without interfering with arrangements which Christ appointed and
intended to continue till His second coming. We have said that there has been
some discussion, not only as to the permanence of this distinction between the
church and the state, arising from the important differences in their
character, constitution, and objects, but likewise as to some of the inferences
deducible from it, or as to what is involved or implied in it.
From a
setting forth of the distinction between the church and the state, and of the
various important and fundamental differences between them, there has been
deduced the inference that there can, and should, be no union or alliance
between them, no definite arrangement for affording to each other mutual
co-operation and assistance. This conclusion we believe to be untrue; we think
it can be positively disproved; and what is more immediately to our present
purpose, we think it very evident that it does not follow from anything that
can be established as to the distinctness of the two societies. Since the
general ends or objects of the two societies, though different, are not only
not opposed to each other, but harmonious and accordant; since they are both
fitted and intended, in their respective spheres, to promote the glory of God
and the welfare of the community, there is no reason why they may not enter
into a friendly union or alliance with each other, provided it is not a union
or alliance of such a kind as to destroy or supersede their distinctness.
It has never been proved that all union or alliance between them must
necessarily possess this character or produce this result; and on the contrary,
it has been shown that the very differences between them afford important
facilities for their affording each other mutual assistance without encroaching
upon one another's province and functions, abandoning their own proper
position, or neglecting their appropriate objects. It has also been maintained
that the distinctness of the state and the church, viewed as including the
origin and nature of the differences between them which it implies, affords a
good ground for the inference that the two societies, and the authorities who
represent and regulate them, are, and ought to be, wholly independent of each
other, with respect to any jurisdiction or authoritative control of the one
over the other; that it precludes the assumption or exercise of any right on
the part of one to interfere authoritatively in the regulation of the affairs
of the other.
We believe that this conclusion is well founded; that it
follows fairly from the premises; and that it can be conclusively established
by a survey of all the materials bearing upon the settlement of the question.
This is the branch of the general subject that bears most immediately upon the
position the Free church has been led to occupy, and the testimony she has been
called upon to bear. It is on this topic that the controversies which have been
long carried on inter imperium et sacerdotium [between the crown and the
priesthood], or as to the relation that ought to subsist between the civil and
ecclesiastical authorities, have almost wholly turned, until in our own day
prominence has been given to the principle of Voluntaryism, or of the entire
separation of church and state, a principle which only cuts the knot, and
certainly does not untie it.
It is not difficult to perceive how it is that
the differences between the church and the state which constitute them two
distinct societies should lay a foundation for their entire independence of
each other in respect to jurisdiction or authoritative control, while they give
no countenance to the doctrine of the necessity of their entire separation, or
of the unlawfulness or impracticability of friendly combination between them
for mutual aid and assistance. That two societies which must come into contact
with each other, and whose leading ends and objects, though different, have yet
no discordance or opposition, should combine more or less for mutual
co-operation and assistance, and of course should make arrangements with each
other with this view, is a position which has every antecedent probability and
presumption in its favour. The burden of proof lies wholly upon those who deny
it.
And then it can, we think, be proved that an obligation attaches to
nations as such, and to civil rulers in their official capacity, to aim at the
promotion of the interests of religion and the welfare of the church. The
appropriate result of this obligation, where both parties rightly understand
their respective duties, and where special circumstances in the condition of
the community do not preclude it, is the formation of a friendly union between
them. On the other hand, the notion that of two naturally and originally
distinct societies, the one should be entitled to exercise jurisdiction or
authoritative control over the other, has every probability or presumption
against it. The burden of proof lies wholly upon those who assert it. (St.
Paul asserts it - by demanding obediance to the "authorities" in his epistles -
editor)
That subordination of the one to the other which is implied in
the exercise of jurisdiction; that is, of such a right of authoritative control
as imposes, ordinarily, a valid obligation to obedience, can be legitimately
based only either upon the natural intrinsic relation of the two societies to
each other, or upon the interposed authority of a common superior. The natural
and original distinctness of the two societies would, upon general principles,
exclude the first of these possible grounds of superiority and subordination;
and there is a great deal in the special features of the two societies in
question, the state and the church, to confirm the exclusion, and nothing
whatever to invalidate it.
If it is alleged, as it has been, that God, the
common superior, has invested the one with a right to exercise authoritative
control over the other, this of course is a position which must be fairly met
and discussed by an investigation of all the materials which legitimately bear
upon it. So far as we can collect the will of God upon this subject from the
more general properties and qualities of the two societies as ascertained
either from reason or revelation, there is certainly nothing whatever to
countenance the idea of the dependence of the one upon the other, of the
subordination of the one to the other, but on the contrary, much to establish
the doctrine of their entire mutual independence in respect to jurisdiction,
and to prove the unwarrantableness and unlawfulness of the one usurping any
authority over the other; and the very same result is brought out by an
examination of the more specific positions alleged to be sanctioned by
Scripture, and to bear more directly upon this particular subject.
From the
nature of the case there are just three theories that can be maintained upon
this subject:
First, that of those who assert the superiority in point of
jurisdiction of the church over the state; the right of the ecclesiastical
rulers to exercise authoritative control in civil matters. This is the doctrine
of the Church of Rome, and has been maintained more or less fully and openly by
most of her leading authorities.
Secondly, that of those who assert the
superiority of the state over the church, or the right of the civil rulers to
exercise jurisdiction in ecclesiastical affairs.
This has usually been
known among us by the name of Erastianism, though it is often spoken of by
continental writers under the designation Byzantinism, a term derived from the
degrading subjection to the civil power to which the Patriarchs of
Constantinople were reduced during the middle ages, while their rivals the
Bishops of Rome attained not only to independence, but to supremacy.
Thirdly, that of those who deny the Popish and the Erastian theories, and
maintain that the church and the state are two co-equal independent powers,
each supreme in its own distinct province, and neither having any authoritative
control over the other.
This is the doctrine taught in the word of God and
in the Westminster Standards, though it can scarcely be said to have any
distinct compendious historical designation in theological literature.
1 As
the alleged absurdity and danger of an imperium in imperio [a state within a
state], and the alleged necessity of some one power or authority that shall
superintend and control everything in a community, is the common basis of the
two leading erroneous theories upon the subject of the relation between the
civil and the ecclesiastical authorities, it may be proper to make some
observations upon it. The direct disproof of it as an argument for the
superiority of the one, and the subordination of the other, is of course to be
found in the proof that the church and state are two distinct independent
societies, each having a distinct government of its own, self-sufficient and
authoritative in its own province, and with reference to its own functions and
objects. If this can be proved, then no valid argument against the application
of the doctrine can be derived from mere inconveniences or embarrassments that
may occasionally arise, especially if it can be further proved, as it can, that
collision and embarrassment may be easily avoided by settling the limits of the
respective provinces or spheres of the two powers.
And there is no such
great difficulty in doing this as is sometimes alleged. Our Saviour has
enjoined his followers to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars's, and
unto God the things that are God's; and this implies that there are some things
which belong to the province of Caesar, or the civil magistrate, which are
subject to his jurisdiction, with respect to which he has rightful authority,
and is ordinarily to be obeyed; reserving, of course, the great principle which
is of universal application, namely, that we must obey God rather than man. It
implies also, that there are some things which are God's, in such a sense not
to belong to Caesar at all; not to belong to his province, or to be subject to
the authority of the civil magistrate. There is no great difficulty in settling
what these things are, respectively. Caesar's things are the persons and the
property of men, and God's things are the conscience of men and the church of
Christ. The civil magistrate has rightful jurisdiction over the persons and the
property of men, because the word of God sanctions his right to the use of the
sword, and because jurisdiction in these matters is evidently indispensable to
the execution of the functions of his office. The attainment of the great end
of civil government, namely, the promotion of the good order and conscience,
for God alone is Lord of the conscience, and has left it free from the
doctrines and commandments of men. He has no jurisdiction over the church of
Christ, because Christ alone is its King and Head, and because by his own
authority in his word, he has made full provision for its government, for the
administration of its affairs, through other parties, without vesting any
control over it in the civil magistrate.
The civil magistrate, we believe,
is bound, in the exercise of his proper authority, in his own province, to aim
at the promotion of religion and the welfare of the church; but though this
obligation brings religion and the church within the scope of his care, it does
not bring them within the sphere of his jurisdiction; or entitle him to deal
with them in a manner inconsistent with, or unauthorized by their proper nature
or their prescribed constitution. The civil magistrate is also entitled to
exercise a certain superintendence and control in religious and ecclesiastical
matters, limited to the object of promoting the attainment, and preventing the
frustration of the great end of his office, the peace and good order of the
community. But this consideration, though authorizing him to restrain and
punish whatever, under pretence of conscience or of ecclesiastical authority,
interferes with the interests he is bound to guard, does not invest him with
legitimate authority in matters of religion, or the affairs of the church, or
enable him to impose upon any a valid obligation to render to him obedience in
these things.
Neither is there any great difficulty in settling the line of
demarcation between things civil or temporal, and things ecclesiastical or
spiritual. Civil or temporal things are just the persons and the property of
men, and ecclesiastical or spiritual things are just the ordinary necessary
business of the church; all those acts and processes which the church performed
and conducted before her connection with the state, and which should be
performed and conducted wherever a church exists, and is in the full execution
of its appropriate functions. And while there is no great difficulty in
settling theoretically the line of demarcation between the church and the
state, neither is their much difficulty in the practical application of sound
principle in this matter. It is true that there are questions in which the
civil and ecclesiastical element are combined. Nay, it is true, as has been
said, that there is no act so purely ecclesiastical but that in some of its
aspects and consequences it may come legitimately under the cognizance of the
civil power; and no act so civil that it may not, provided it be done by a
member of the church, come legitimately under the cognizance of the
ecclesiastical authorities. But notwithstanding all this, there is no great
difficulty in disentangling the one from the other by a fair and honest
application of the principles that have been stated.
In this way it is easy
to show that there is no necessity for subordinating the one society to the
other; while, at the same time, the process suggests considerations which
contribute to establish the great general truth, which of itself would fully
answer the argument, even if the practical difficulties were far greater than
they are, namely, that the church and the state are two distinct societies,
each supreme in its own sphere, and neither dependent on the other in respect
to jurisdiction or authoritative control. The Popish argument for the
superiority of ecclesiastical over the civil in point of authority, derived
from the higher and more exalted character of the ends or objects of the church
than of the state, has manifestly no weight. There is, indeed, no connection
between the premises and the conclusion. This notion, however, enables them to
dispense with the necessity of denying the appointment of a distinct government
in the state, and allow them to concede this, affording, as it does, a pretence
for alleging that the administration of this distinct government must be
subordinated to the ecclesiastical authorities. The Erastians are reduced to
greater straits. Concurring with the Papists in holding that the one must be
superior and the other subordinate, they have no very plausible pretence of a
general kind for alleging that the superiority lies on the side of the state;
and thus they have been led to adopt as the only plausible ground on which to
defend the right of the civil power to exercise jurisdiction in ecclesiastical
matters, a denial that Christ has appointed a distinct government in his
church, in the hands of other parties than the civil magistrate.
2
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